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ABSTRACT	
  
Currently in Santander, Colombia, a contentious debate over the demarcation of a
protective boundary of the Santurbán Páramo is underway. For the approximately 9000
páramo residents, the collateral effects of the outcome could result in dispossession of
lands and livelihoods. This paper will argue that status quo Colombian territorial zoning,
at the service of Canadian mining interests cast domestically as the principal
“locomotora” (driving force) of national development, allows different expressions of
state and civil society actors to either bypass or use environmental protections as means
of personal gain and/or capitalist expansion. Mobilizing under a discourse of
conservation, down-stream urban residents have made important advances toward water
sovereignty while livelihoods of rural upstream residents become more precarious. The
central research question of this paper asks: What are feasible development alternatives to
large-scale mining for páramo residents and by whom are they being authored? Using
field participant interviews and field research to analyze the actors involved and
overarching discourses evoked in the debate, I consider the ways that environmentalism
collaborates with private capital. In this light, I then question how the ambiguous role of
the state may not only limit, but also open opportunities for better outcomes for
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Santurbán Páramo residents. By examining the entry of the Canadian company X Oro
into the páramo, this paper considers how the resultant protests by urban residents
downstream have stigmatized rural residents near the mine operation. Using a cultural
political economy approach, I will analyze the points at which state, civil society, and
capital are colliding, reinforcing, and collaborating. I propose that a more productive way
of understanding eventual outcomes and possibilities for Páramo residents considers that
the central issues in the Santurbán Páramo debate not be viewed only as an arena for
environmental protection, but rather a framework for environmental justice that takes full
account of the socio-economic equity and access to opportunities for the people most
affected. By using Jessop’s Framework for transnational economic and social processes, I
consider how different forms of private capital interact with state and civil society
through social mobilization and environmentalism. My findings suggest ways that landuse planning driven by local actors and grounded in situated knowledge and
regional/national land-equality movements could inform the process of participatory
development authorship for páramo residents.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
“There is no template for mining management in Colombia. There is no template for
Páramo delimitation.”
The above quote by environmental economist and community planner Juan
Cardenas may seem obvious and applicable to all community-based planning approaches
in that every community’s needs are place-based and specific to the environmental,
social, and cultural contexts in which they are situated. The second sentence of Dr.
Cardenas’ quote, however, is far more problematic and speaks to the complex overlay of
ecology and politics at play in Santurbán Páramo. Such official designations or park
statuses have often proven permeable and unenforced. Although there truly is a template
for demarcation that is supposedly informed by biological determinants, legislation and
enforcement is highly influenced by political considerations, ones channeled less in
response to the needs of local communities and more with the flow of capital. This case
study asks what meaningful options will be feasible for communities when the state’s
regulatory responsibility is preempted by its role as broker for transnational capital.
My research takes as its point of departure that large-scale mining inevitably has
overall negative environmental and social impacts on local communities and little
sustainable and equitable yield for local economies. I developed my principal research
questions, “What are the development alternatives to large scale mining in Santurbán
Páramo and by whom are they being authored?” with the overarching goal of showing
how the international capitalist economy affects a specific ecosystem and the population
that depends on it. On that basis, an inquiry into possible and viable preservation options
that account for the social and economic vitality of local communities could follow. My
initial intent was to raise awareness about local visions of development (specifically from
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rural residents) that might contest economic globalization. My presumption was that
community visions of both land preservation and productive activities would contest the
National Development Plan, which bolsters transnational, large-scale mining as a main
driving force of the national economy1. My interest in the impacts of transnational
mining came from earlier professional experiences in Colombia working in international
advocacy for the protection of threatened communities and human rights defenders, as
well as the monitoring of and educating about the adverse effects of U.S. military and
economic policy in Colombia. In these roles I repeatedly witnessed the causal link
between economic, and many times multinational, interests, and the complex territorial
conflict that results in human and collective rights abuses. My intention to spend time
interviewing residents in páramo villages was intended to give some counterweight to the
visible and often vocalized urban perspective by elaborating a more nuanced and in-depth
understanding of impacts and alternatives for rural residents closest to mine operations.
Currently in Santander, where the protective boundary of the Santurbán Páramo
should be drawn is being ardently debated. The Santurbán Páramo, a delicate high
mountain moorland, provides water for about 2 million urban inhabitants that primarily
live in the city of Bucaramanga. The Canadian gold company X Oro2, with exploratory
but still not extractive rights, insists in an industry-funded report that its proposed area of
operations is “associated with…Andean and High-Andean Forest [not] high moor [i.e.
páramo] ecosystem3” (ECODES 2014). However, environmental experts and advocates
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
1	
  	
  El	
  Locomotora	
  Minero-‐Energetico	
  named	
  a	
  principal	
  economic	
  activity	
  in	
  President	
  Juan	
  Manuel	
  

Santos’	
  National	
  Development	
  Plan,	
  which	
  made	
  explicit	
  the	
  economic	
  policy	
  of	
  his	
  predecessor	
  
Alvaro	
  Uribe	
  to	
  attract	
  foreign,	
  particularly,	
  mining	
  investment.	
  
2	
  The	
  name	
  of	
  the	
  of	
  Company	
  has	
  been	
  changed	
  to	
  protect	
  the	
  interest	
  of	
  those	
  involved	
  in	
  the	
  study	
  
3	
  The	
  report	
  was	
  developed	
  by	
  Ecodes	
  Engineering	
  Ltd	
  with	
  the	
  support	
  of	
  the	
  Colombian	
  Chamber	
  
of	
  Mines,	
  Asomineros	
  ANDI	
  and	
  the	
  Association	
  for	
  Large-‐Scale	
  Mining,	
  SMGE.	
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strongly disagree. After 20 years of presence at the site, and $200 million in investment,
the company argues that the Colombian Government should allow it to stay and begin
extraction. Though still in limbo, the company maintains operations to reassure
stockholders of their eventual ability to fully access one of the largest gold veins in Latin
America.
There are two groups of Colombian citizens flanking the delimitation debate—the
urban-based Committee for the Defense of Water and Santurbán Páramo (Comité) in
Bucaramanga, and a local group of rural residents of Santurbán Páramo. This second
group represents around 9000 inhabitants and consists of small-scale miners and farmers
who live in these mountains near the mine site. The voices claiming to speak for this
group contend that their traditions and history, lifestyles and economies are not being
sufficiently considered in land use management. They continue to demand their rights to
decent livelihoods.
Downstream and on the opposite side of the debate, the Comité pulls together
large groups from a vast spectrum of civil society actors from the departmental capital
and largest city, Bucaramanga. In 2010, the Committee began formally organizing
against the mine to protect their water source from cyanide and mercury contamination.
So far, this group has been effective in pressuring the state not to grant extractive rights
to X Oro. But X Oro, calmed by the favorable national atmosphere for large-scale
mining, is not budging. This case study asks what alternatives to mining may be feasible
to communities when the state’s regulatory responsibility is preempted by its role as
broker for transnational capital.
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In trying to paint a clear picture of alternative development options, I first had to
understand the nature of decision-making power, implementation and enforcement in
Santander, Colombia. Pervasive political corruption and a protracted civil war frequently
magnify the gap between de jure rights protections and de facto practices in Colombia.
The state approach to land use and territorial planning undertaken in the backdrop of
armed conflict and periods of state decentralization consists largely of making territories
governable in order to expand global trade and attract foreign capital. Numerous
historical and current examples reveal the local effects and costs, in both human and
environmental terms, of global economy(ies) of violence. The issue of hidden interests
and ulterior motives was frequently indicated or alluded to by those I interviewed, and
the multifaceted frustrations that various actors faced when trying to mobilize meaningful
action within these parameters hinged on questions of class, social-economic position and
access to power.
In the course of field research, the following key findings of this study began to
emerge:
-In the case of transnational mining in Santurbán páramo, social protest, though effective
in helping protect a threatened ecosystem, has exacerbated a divide between urban and
rural residents. The hegemonic/counter hegemonic tension at play in the public debate
eclipses the needs of the páramo residents most subordinated. Instead of opening a
region-wide participatory space that accounts for multiple conceptions of environmental
subjects and identities, the urban-based environmental coalition focuses on
reformist/regulatory political pressure.
-As it is evoked both by the urban-based environmental coalition, and by state/NGO led
responses, environmentalism tends to align with private capital
-Responses to that pressure are giving rise to new state mechanisms along with new
configurations of capital in the region, the outcomes of which result in both opportunities
and obstacles for páramo residents and their sovereignty and well-being.
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These findings and the obstacles I faced to my own initial research plan (to be
discussed below) led me to a second research question: “How might the ambiguous role
of the state not only limit, but also open opportunities for better outcomes for Páramo
residents?” This second question will be discussed by analyzing the implicit and explicit
development possibilities presented by 1) the Comité’s organizing points and 2) the
State/NGO/UN- led Mesa de Trabajo. This feasibility study will hinge largely on a mix
between state interventions/subsidies and environmental capitalism in the form of
Payments for Ecological Services to Páramo Residents as presented by the Mesa de
Trabajo.
This thesis represents findings from fieldwork conducted during the summers of
2013 and 2014 and considers secondary data during a historic frame until the end of
November 2014. Many uncertainties remain for the future of Santurbán Páramo. At the
time of writing, it is still uncertain where the protective boundary will be drawn and how
it will be enforced – i.e., if indeed X Oro will have to halt operations and if and to what
extent mining jobs will disappear from the area. The approximately 9000 residents who
make these lands home however, do not all work for transnational mines: many are
small-scale farmers/ livestock workers or artisanal miners and do not directly benefit
from the mining company. As the main source of water for over 2 million inhabitants in
the department of Santander (not even considering the water it supplies to the department
of Norte de Santander as well) the Páramo in many ways is the future of public health
and vitality for all residents in the region.
All stakeholders involved in the debate can agree to the central importance of
protecting water. But this study will wade into the difficult question of whether by
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making water a commodity, through payments through ecosystem services nature can be
compelled to pay for itself in order to save itself, and how such a process would affect the
rural residents most immediately involved. Given all the negative externalities for
communities and nature that are part and parcel of globalized extractive economies, what
would it take for governments to resolve to leave resources in the ground? For companies
to desist? Given the stakes of the neoliberalized economy as they are, answering the
questions of corporate and citizen responsibility—of who, in the end, should pay for such
decisions—implicates an ever expanding web far beyond the upstream/downstream
populations most immediately impacted by the mine site.
While I critique certain aspects of the social movement and governance systems
involved, first and foremost, I commend the organizing efforts of the Comité in
contesting the imminent threat that large-scale mining poses to the well-being of the
residents of Santander. Likewise, I acknowledge the important efforts of the actors
involved in the Mesa de Trabajo who are looking for creative solutions to protect land
and water while still protecting feasible livelihoods for páramo residents. Based on the
interviews I conducted and secondary research, I offer these reflections as constructive
criticisms; an invitation for the actors involved to consider additional implications of the
way discourses are framed and possible manners of making the movement and
governance systems more inclusive.
1.1 Methodology
In this study, I observed that the state and civil society (as represented by the Comité)
though ostensibly at odds, were in effect mutually reinforcing each other’s power, and in
so doing, eclipsing the voices of rural páramo residents. I chose Santurbán Páramo and
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Canadian gold mining company X Oro (formerly Zstar) as an arena of investigation to rethink possibilities for recasting environmental regulation as participatory planning in
areas of territorial conflict driven by transnational capital. As a response to a weak state
regulatory role, my research inquiry focused on Canada’s role in writing mining
legislation in Colombia, civil society’s response through mass protest, and the resultant
frictions between urban and rural residents.
1.1a Limitations of research in conflict zones and implications as findings
I chose this area not only because of its investigative merit inherent in the urgent
threat to the delicate páramo ecosystem and prime water source for 2 million inhabitants,
but also for a more practical reason. It is a rural zone in Colombia that, since 2005, has
been largely free of guerilla and paramilitary presences, and public order is therefore by
and large secure. For the purpose of my study, then, I believed it to be an area where
neither my own nor my participants’ safety would be compromised. Though this sense
was confirmed during my initial, exploratory field study in 2013, several conversations
with rural residents in 2014 lead me to a different conclusion. I believe these security and
access limitations not only constitute findings in themselves regarding the question of
feasibility of participatory planning in conflict zones, but also represent an important
reminder of the methodological and ethical considerations for outsiders. By opening
questions of subject position, this study considers the role of expert vs. situated
knowledge in community planning.
1.1b Barriers: Power-mapping vacuum
By interviewing urban environmentalist/activists, NGO project officials, and the
community members most closely affected, along with evaluating demographic and other
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materials, I sought to delineate the stakeholders and decision making power structures,
and in this way to suggest alternatives to large-scale mining, specifically highlighting
local campesino and small-scale miner’s positions. Yet mistrust of outsiders (specifically
environmentalists from nearby Bucaramanga, the largest metropolitan center in
Santander), resultant fatigue from multiple community diagnostic studies with no
immediate results, along with aforementioned security concerns, limited participant scope
from the rural groups. It was much easier to interview a larger, more comprehensive
contingent of people from the urban area. The only group I encountered from the city
undertaking preliminary steps to break down this urban/rural divide was still in the
process of formulating a roadmap (“hoja de rutas”) for development alternatives for
residents of Páramo towns, and was being commissioned to do so by the departmental
government.
My initial research design sought to triangulate quantitative data in the form of
demographic indicators and land use maps with qualitative data obtained through
participant-observer interviews. However as I got further into the research, I found it
necessary to employ a grounded theory approach. This method calls on the researcher to
be self-reflexive and responsively modify hypotheses and methods according to an
unfolding research narrative (Glaser and Strauss 1973). This approach was most useful
to me in order to adapt to limitations.
While reflecting on the barriers I encountered in attempting to access accounts
from rural residents themselves about viable preservation, economic and social options, it
became evident that the voice of residents did not carry the same weight as that of the
state and civil society in Bucaramanga. Part of my initial research design included an
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analysis of official base-line indicators and demographic information from the Colombian
National Department of Statistics, DANE. Early in the interview process, however, I
realized that DANE does not undertake a National Census in communities that lie above
3000ft. with the justification that they are too marginal (Personal interview Instituto
Humboldt). With grounded theory informing my approach, this apparent obstacle became
a finding in itself regarding state demographic methods and discourses, which ultimately
render certain sectors of the population invisible.
These doubts regarding local agency translated into a deeper need to understand
the forces at work behind and the goals pursued by the authors of alternative
development. The findings regarding this question of agency are discussed in Analysis of
Actors in Chapter 3.
1.2 Grounded theory and research chronology
My research design included two research trips. During the summer of 2013, I
spent two weeks in Colombia as an ‘exploratory trip.’ I interviewed several dozen people,
both formally and informally, in Bogota and Bucaramanga, to understand the context of
transnational mining in Colombia, legal frameworks and mechanisms, and growing
national and regional social movements opposed to large-scale mining, or specifically,
transnational mining. I also made a trip to the Santurbán Páramo.
True to my grounded theory approach, my focus shifted based on discoveries
made during exploratory fieldwork. During my return trip during the summer of 2014, I
planned to spend at least one to two weeks on the Páramo itself, interviewing the
residents of towns most immediately affected. The limitations I encountered to setting up
extensive interviews or focus
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Table 1: Summary of Interviews conducted in 2013 and 2014

groups in the Páramo towns will be discussed in the following sub-section. However, the
process of interviewing local environmental authorities, environmentalists, and activists
in Bucaramanga for research as well as trying to set up logistics for travel, was
illuminating. It allowed me to articulate a clearer understanding of the divide on the issue.
I was able to observe urban coalition meetings, review documents, and interview
Bucaramanga residents directly and indirectly. Additionally, during time spent in Bogota,
I collected information from the National Geographical Institute, the Environmental
Ministry, the Ministry of Mines and Energy and the Alexander Van Humboldt Institute (a
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semi-private, semi-public entity whose mission is the protection of Colombian
biodiversity and which has been tasked with advising the national government regarding
biodiversity and strategic ecosystems, including nation-wide páramo
delimitation/protection).
These “on-site” findings which led me to my final research question, allowed me
to understand which actors were involved in authoring alternative, non-mining
development options for páramo residents and which options had become tenable. The
relevant actors included:
1. Comité por la Defensa del Agua y Páramo de Santurbán (Comité) – The
urban-based civic movement that brings together social and human rights
organizations, professors, power-brokers (Director of the Water Authority,
local politicians, etc.) including key legislators. This group is calling for the
government to resolve the problem.
2. Mesa de Alternativas – An environmental NGO, split off from the Comité
forged an alliance with the United Nations Development Programme as a way
to look for direct alternatives for Páramo residents. Eventually this effort was
taken up by the Santander Governor’s office. Along with members of the
academic community, this group is elaborating a roadmap (hojas de rutas) to
put forth alternative development projects and is attempting to gain the trust of
the mayors of the páramo towns.
1.2 Explanation of analytical framework and thesis organization:
1.2a State, civil society, private capital in the Global Political Economy
In trying to answer the research question regarding possible development alternatives to
large-scale mining and their authorship, I had to develop an understanding of authority,
jurisdiction and implementation mechanisms, stakeholder interests and ways decisionmaking power functions. Instead of testing a hypothesis about how decision-making
happens, participant responses and my observations guided my analysis. As findings
began to unfold, I found I needed to situate state, civil society and transnational
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stakeholders against the backdrop of the Colombian Mining Code of 2001—pivotal
legislation that both increased state power over resources and opened up the domestic
extractive industry to foreign investment. The authorship of this legislation was highly
influenced by the Canadian state. In the case of Santurbán, however, the power of private
capital was not only evident in the activities of the Canadian mining company X Oro, but
in other forms of local private capital and political influence. In both the data collection
and analysis phase, I began to see the importance and complexity of how governance
(and its absence) was driving the local environmental debate and its social consequences.
Therefore, in order to situate actors within the multiple political, geographic and
economic scales at play I deployed Bob Jessop’s discussion of the complexities of local
governance embedded in a global political economy. Jessop’s theory and its relevance to
this study will be introduced in the review of literature (Chapter 2).
1.2b Thesis Organization:
The review of literature (Chapter 2) will briefly introduce the relevant theory used in the
context of this study. The theory will be applied throughout, especially in order to gain a
more nuanced understanding of the stakeholders. After an overview of general
background/context, I frame the central debate by locating the two groups most affected
by situating each group in relation to the reformed mining code of 2001 and definitions of
sustainability. Following that, in the Analysis of Actors section, I apply the theory
introduced in the literature review to explain how power works, through what
mechanisms, and toward what ends. Building on that, the feasibility of alternatives
considers the two bodies of development alternatives that now exist, and considers the
opportunities and obstacles that characterize each alternative path. Finally, the concluding
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section gives my recommendations regarding participatory decision-making that includes
páramo residents.
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Chapter 2: Theory and Background
2.1 Review of Literature
In order to try to understand the specific problems of coordination, resource
sharing, and concerted action, I turned to sociologist Jessop’s consideration of
governance systems within a global political economy. Jessop is a leading scholar in the
“cultural political economy” research paradigm who has built his work on the social
theory of Antonio Gramsci and Nicos Poulantzas. Jessop is a leading scholar in the
“cultural political economy” research paradigm. His approach develops Gramsci’s insight
that the state is more than simply a governing body, but instead a social relation that runs
through society in multiple manifestations, all of which are driven by certain class
interests. Taking this as a premise, Jessop considers the contemporary state not just as an
instrument of a particular national class, but one that is embedded in power hierarchies on
a global scale. This interpretation of the global political economy is concerned with ways
in which political forces (states, institutions, and individual actors) shape systems of
economic exchange and the political and social affects of those exchanges. Jessop argues
that the result has been a dramatic intensification of societal complexity (Jessop 2003).
Considering not only economic and political, but also cultural forces, his paradigm
approaches the interrelations among “semiosis, imaginaries, political economy […] and
issues of governance, government, and governmentality.” (Jessop 2009) The ensuing
problems that occur in economic, political, and social life, according to Jessop, cannot be
managed readily through either “top-down state planning or market-mediated anarchy”
(Jessop 2003, 7), but rather by a third way: governance. For Jessop, the concept and study
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of governance allows the requisite flexibility to manage growing institutional
interconnectedness and a dramatic increase in societal complexity (2003, 6).
The cultural political economy research paradigm is expansive and many of its
expressions lie well beyond the scope of my study. However, I use it here especially to
understand the ways transnational companies can succeed in mobilizing local actors at
various scales. For Jessop, this happens at different tiers among a plurality of states and
economic actors. The dominance of certain states on the international arena does not
imply the rise of a world state, but rather a “conditional delegation” of political and
economic functions in order to improve economic policy coordination across different
states and scales. It is never purely a one-way, top-down or bottom-up process, but rather
“multi-tiered.” (Jessop 2002, 197). For this reason, “interstate politics on a global scale
[are] often marked by the international hegemony of a national state that seeks to develop
a hegemonic political[/economic] strategy for the global system” (Jessop 2002, 197).
Both Canada and the Unites States have free trade agreements with the Colombian state
and a “complex articulation of governmental powers and other forms of governance” that
intersect with the Colombian state (Jessop 2002, 197). Such political and economic
policies and ideologies go against the overall political interests of Colombia. For
example, under the terms of free trade agreements, international companies may be able
to sue the Colombian state for environmental regulations that stand in the way of profit.
But read as an international hegemony, the Colombian state embraces and perpetuates
neoliberal ideologies and policies that are, arguably, against its best interests.
To illustrate how this example works in Santurbán, we can look at the way
Canadian institutions shaped the drafting of Colombian mining legislation that favored
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Canadian investment. This was buttressed by military funding from the United States that
allowed the Colombian military to offer on-site protections for transnational mining
operations. At the local level, the mining company itself paid for infrastructure projects in
the towns of Vetas and California and bought small-scale miners titles at low prices
before sellers could consider the overarching ramifications of selling their lands. Under
the banner of corporate social responsibility, the companies offered social programs and
economic development where state presence has been miniscule. They invested in
schools, held “ferias” and installed statues, museums, and other symbolic infrastructure
and cultural activities that underscored the importance of mining as part of rural
residents’ identity. “The relative success of global actors (such as global institutions or
transnational companies) in securing global governance depends on their mobilization of
actors from other sites and scales” (Jessop 2006). 	
  Jessop speaks of a diffusion of
discourses and actions at local levels as a “sub-hegemony” in which actors and
intermediaries speak the intended hegemonic language. This is seen in Santurbán in the
local mayor in California who supports the company’s presence. Additionally, the local
mining union leader, and other local leaders receive material and symbolic rewards to
translate neoliberal ‘language’ into local context through every day practices that align
the history of mining in the region and their cultural traditions with support for X Oro
(Jessop 2006). “Sub-hegemonic centers of power […] reverberate back to the hegemonic
sites [to be] absorbed into the hegemonic codes” (Jessop 2006). Therefore, local mayors,
the union president, and townspeople are more willing to ignore the negative
environmental externalities of business operations and defend the mine’s presence and
the concept that mining, even transnational large-scale mining, is an integral part of their

	
  

17	
  

identity. This is a clear example of a hegemonic irony: though many páramo residents
previously owned or operated small-scale mines, many of them were duped into selling
their mines to companies. Yet even though this meant the loss of financial autonomy and
increased dependency on uncertain employment offered by multinationals, those miners
now support and defend multinational presence. It reveals X Oro’s effectiveness and
influence over sub-hegemonic power nodes to perpetuate a favorable discourse, and
establish allies in local governance.
Departmental regional elites from Bucaramanga, however, had little to gain from
the international hegemony that favors large-scale mining, and therefore resisted that
international hegemonic discourse. As will be elaborated throughout this paper, urban
elites were able to mobilize a massive and diverse urban base around the material and
symbolic importance of water. The effort of activating this new political community
became a counter-hegemonic project at odds with the large-scale mining agenda as
promoted by the National Development Plan.
My case study, then, presents an example of the complexity that arises in the
fissures between the regulatory obligation of the state to its citizens and its ever-growing
role as broker for private capital: in Jessop’s words, the “complex dialectic of deterritorialization and re-territorialization as the taken-for-grantedness of the national
sovereign state continues to erode” (2003, 7). Another element of complexity arises from
juxtapositions in the temporal dimension: from “split-second timing (computer-driven
trading) to growing awareness of the acceleration of […] social and environmental
change” (2003,7). The urgency of this tension can be seen in Santurbán: As global gold
prices began to rise in 2000, mineral deposits that were once seen as too costly by
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investors to pursue became lucrative. Not only did this include deposits that were harder
to get to or further from shipping centers, it also included deposits located in ecologically
fragile areas such as páramos. Furthermore, these areas are already noted to require
extensive environmental management costs because they are believed to be shrinking as a
result of the rise in global temperatures.
Jessop discusses governance as the “art of complexity” to be handled with
requisite flexibility. In doing so, he emphasizes the importance of a Foucauldian interest
in the role of power and knowledge in shaping social agents. Institutional fixes tend to
orient toward objects to be managed, rather than subjects that participate, act and are
represented. In the case of Santurbán, for example, this would raise questions not only of
institutional compatibility, but also of the class and cultural barriers across which power
and access, both individual and collective, are distributed.
Jessop uses the term “metagovernance” to characterize efforts that organize the
conditions for governance and involve managing the complexity, plurality, and tangled
hierarchies found in prevailing coordination systems. He notes that it must involve the
“judicious mixing of market, hierarchy, and networks to achieve the best possible
outcomes.” (2003, 15) But these outcomes are always structurally inscribed and cannot
help but manifest entrenched bias and asymmetrical privileging. In following chapters, I
will describe the efforts of the Mesa de Trabajo as an effort in metagovernance: one, that
like every such practice, is prone to failure.
Jessop suggests that given that there is no manner in which actors involved in
metagovernance can ever transcend their own subjectivity, those involved must assume a
type of “public romantic irony” (2003, 19) for some semblance of equity and success to
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be possible. This implies a high level of self-reflexivity in which those involved with
metagovernance acknowledge the likelihood of failure and incompleteness, but proceed
anyway. Jessop rebuts the notion that this form of irony is fatalism. It is, rather, the
ability of those involved in governance to recognize their position as both observer and
participant. Along with this, actors should be able and willing to acknowledge their own
limitations to full comprehension about what is being observed. As such, they must make
contingency plans for unexpected eventualities (2003, 17). Complexity calls for
flexibility—i.e. a commitment to participatory forms of governance and embedded
mechanisms of accountability. In complex public debates such as Santurbán, which
involves a wide mix of actors with differing degrees of clout and voice, and varying
points of convergence and divergence of interests, a self-reflexive form of
metagovernance may be the only opportunity to open spaces for those traditionally
excluded from policymaking to have some power over the decisions that affect their dayto-day lives. In this way, and perhaps with enough support, local actors could interrupt
the manifestations of global hegemony at work in Santurbán Páramo.
2.2 General Background
2.2.1 Angostura mine site: Environmental impact and management
The Angostura mining concession solicited by Zstar4 Ltd (now X Oro), a
Canadian mining company lies deep in the eastern Colombian Andes. Zstar sought
permission from the Colombian Government to mine for gold and silver in the mountain
system known as Santurbán, specifically near the stream of Angostura, from which the
mining project takes its name. The unique biology of the “páramo” ecosystem supplies
water not only to the surrounding rural mountain inhabitants, but to 2.2 million
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inhabitants of Bucaramanga and Cucuta and nearly 20 nearby municipalities. Páramos are
important and unique bio-systems found at an altitude of 3,000 to 5,000 meters and in the
case of Santurbán, cover nearly 83,000 hecatares. Because of their biological
composition, including volcanic soils and specially adapted flora, páramos are considered
natural “factories” of potable water (Maldonado and Urrea 2011). The integrity of the
páramo system has major implications for the public health of the inhabitants of the entire
department of Santander.
The plan that Zstar presented to the Colombian government sought to use an
open-pit method to excavate more than 2,700 acres and construct two piles of tailings and
a dump at an altitude of 8,500 to 13,450 feet. Cyanide is used to extract pure gold from
mineral ore, and among the most harmful consequences of Zstar’s operation for the
residents of Santander would be long-term exposure to the cyanide that would leach into
the waters. Cyanide itself is extremely lethal, and some of the byproducts of the
degradation process it produces, such as nitrates, may contaminate groundwater. A
bigger issue is that the use of cyanide allows mining companies to go after very lowgrade ore, which means they end up digging up more earth to produce the same amount
of gold. This produces a huge amounts of tailings. Gold tailing ponds and piles are full of
contaminants such as arsenic, antimony, residual cyanide, and mercury, and so must be
carefully managed to avoid generating runoff or coming into contact with wildlife. These
tailings can stay toxic for centuries (Rastogi 2010). As downstream residents were
informed of the threats to water sources, outrage and fear began to grow.
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Figure 2. Flow of Water Through Páramo
Instituto Humboldt (2011) Guía Divulgativa de criterios para la delimitación de páramos de Colombia.

2.2.2 Civil Society Responds in Protest
In 2010, the Colombian Government approved Law 1382. It amended the Mining
Code to formalize the implicit environmental protections mandated by the Constitution of
1991. The new law increased the areas protected from mine concessions, including
páramo and wetland ecosystems. The companies with pending concessions panicked and
pressured the government: “In the eight months between the approval and ratification of
the law, the area licensed for mining increased by approximately 80%” (“Mining at what
cost” 2011). Using the environmental protections of Law 1382, an urban movement
began formally organizing against the mine. The Committee for the Defense of the
Páramo of Santurbán pulled together large groups from a vast spectrum of civil society
actors in Bucaramanga and Cucutá (both cities that would have been directly impacted by
mining tailings of the Angostura project) as well as in Bogotá and Cartagena. The
committee coordinated collective protest actions and most importantly generated public
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outrage against the project through print and electronic media (Aranguren 2010). The
organizing culminated in several mobilizations of hundreds of thousands of people in the
streets of Bucaramanga, demanding that their rights to safe, cyanide-free water be
protected by the state (Aranguren 2010).
Given the government’s hesitation to grant the mining license because of the
protests, Zstar withdrew its original project plan for an open pit, heap leach gold mine.
Zstar was forced to admit the environmental damage the project would have caused to the
delicate páramo ecosystem. However, in a period of a few months, Zstar changed its
name to X Oro, replaced its board of directors, and recast its project as an underground,
rather than an open pit mine, which would utilize a process free of any contaminating
chemicals that could endanger water sources and urban protesters. Environmentalists and
páramo experts contend, however, that tunneling underground into páramo wetlands over
the long term will have affects similar to those of open pit mining: because the special
soils are so porous, tunneling under them will simply leach and drain water away,
destroying vegetal cover and soils.
Currently, X Oro remains in the area in an “exploratory” phase awaiting the
national government’s determination of the protective boundary around the Natural Park
that, at the time of this writing, has not yet been demarcated. According to the Chief of
Operations of X Oro, it has been worth waiting out the eighteen years of the preextractive exploratory phase. Given that their concession sits on what’s been called one
of largest gold deposits in Latin America, it is obviously worth the wait.
2.2.3 Páramo residents and Land
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The pressures from urban protesters forced the regional environmental authority,
the Corporación Autonoma Regional de la Defense de la Meseta de Bucaramanga
(CDMB) to demarcate a line that protected the Santurbán páramo from extractive and
other productive activities in the Páramo. That line also calls into question the rights to
decent livelihood of the residents of the ten villages in Santurbán, comprised of
approximately 9000 people. Such demarcations would affect not only the two
communities closest to Angostura mine site—California and Vetas—that have directly
relied on jobs from X Oro and other large mining companies in the area, but would also
affect the other low lying communities that consist of small-scale miners who have
historically mined in cooperatives, as well as the farmers and small-scale ranchers who
cultivate primarily onions and other subsistence crops.
It should be emphasized that environmental law in Colombia prohibits both
mining and farming in páramos (Bautista 2014). From a conservation stance, the head of
Instituto von Humboldt agrees that to create plans that consider the long-term protection
of páramo lands, neither mining nor farming should be allowed, and instead PES should
be prioritized.
2.2.4 Mining in Colombia, Violence, and Santurbán in Context
It is impossible to discuss mining in Colombia without situating it in the context
of human rights violations. According to numerous international NGOs such as Human
Rights Watch and Amnesty International, Colombia has the worst human rights records
in the western hemisphere because of, on the one hand, ongoing extrajudicial killings by
the Colombian Armed Forces, and, on the other, the second highest rate of forced
displacement in the world after South Sudan. According to the Colombian Comptroller
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General’s Office at least 80% of human rights violations that occur in Colombia happen
in fossil fuel extraction and mining towns (35% of the national total towns); 87% of
forced displacement happens in towns that receive royalties for mining and energy
production, and 78% of crimes against unionists, 89% against indigenous and 90%
against Afro-Colombians happen in mining and energy regions (Garay 2013). The case
of Santurbán illustrates what Aparicio and Blaser call the “subordination of non-modern
worlds by violent means” (64). Santurbán has not been a site of military campaign since
late early 2000s during Operación Berlín, when the Colombian armed forces eliminated
the guerilla presence and installed two high mountain military battalions. The current
situation in this area is therefore not one of state repression through military or
paramilitary use of force. A more nuanced kind of violence characterizes the relations of
power: the imposition of expert knowledge over the situated knowledge of the local
communities. The environmental conflict has raised the possibility of restrictions on their
productive activities and possible “forced displacement from ‘unproductive’ lands”
(Aparicio and Blaser 64). The dispute between a powerful urban coalition, transnational
capital, and the state produced an incongruous situation for small scale farmers: it called
into question not just their livelihoods but their traditional relationship to the land.
In response to the urban protests, X Oro organized a group of its workers from
California and Vetas into the so-called “Comité por la Defensa del Territorio” as a
counterbalance to the urban coalition in Bucaramanga stridently pressuring for the
company to leave. The other, principally farming communities of the páramo began
speaking out to regional authorities, defending their rights over their land and denouncing
the lack of options under prohibitive environmental demarcations. However, the
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intersection of jurisdictions, and lack of clarity about the corresponding coordinating and
regulatory authority (between the local environmental authority, national ministry of
environment, Ministry of Mines and Energy) has thwarted residents’ pursuit of their
productive activities, land use planning (“Delimitación del páramo…” 2014) and
ultimately, obfuscated their position in relation to the nation-state.
The debate over the protective delimitation of the Santurbán Páramo in Santander,
Colombia, has become an emblematic example of civil society’s attempts to conserve a
fragile ecosystem from state led development investments. However, a contentious
debate over the demarcation of the protective boundary of the Santurbán Páramo
continues. For the approximately 9000 páramo residents, the collateral effects of the
outcome could result in dispossession of lands and livelihoods.
Meanwhile, X Oro, with exploratory but still not extractive rights within the
páramo, insists that its proposed area of operations are outside of what may be
scientifically considered the páramo ecosystem. They argue that the Colombian
Government should not, then, deny the company’s environmental license.
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Chapter 3: Actors
3.1 Central debate and affected groups: contested definitions of sustainability
Flanking the debate are two groups of Colombian citizens—the urban-based Committee
for the Defense of Water and Santurbán Páramo (Comité) in Bucaramanga, on the one
hand, against a local group that represents the interests of inhabitants of Santurbán
Páramo, on the other. In this section, I will present the way the debate is being publically
framed by the media, institutions and government. I will do so primarily through a
discursive analysis since plans and positions are still evolving and contingent upon final
decisions regarding the protective boundary. Additionally, by using a discursive analysis,
I intend to avoid making claims about who is ‘right,’ and rather focus on the explicit and
implicit assumptions that make each option possible, and thereby consider what
opportunities and obstacles may lie in the implementation of each. This approach
considers how each group is defining the concept of sustainability. Finally, I will explore
the implications of the liberalized 2001 mining code through the lens of these contested
definitions of sustainability. This will foreground a more in depth consideration of the
actors who are authoring development alternatives in “Analysis of Actors” later in this
chapter.
3.1.1 Urban Coalition: Comité por la Defensa del Agua y el Páramo de Santurbán
The civil society-based environmental movement in the city of Bucaramanga mixes
activism against mining multinationals with the defense of water for present and future
generations—water that seems to be insufficient to guarantee economic competitiveness
or the entire regions’ ability to adapt to climate change. For this faction, the protective
boundary of the páramo should be drawn considering the worst possible future
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environmental scenario. Their demands, Bautista (2013) argues, have been formulated
“without evidencing a clear understanding of all the implications at the local level [for
Páramo residents] nor of the required transfer of responsibility.”
It was not difficult to discern the composition of the Comité. As James Haynes, a
scholar of social movements notes, the ability to “build a relatively wide-ranging
coalition of groups and organizations, large and representative enough to take on the state
and its allies, such as large landowners, senior military figures or important business
interests” is a key characteristic of successful environmental movements, especially in the
developing world. (Haynes 239). The key players in the Comité come from the middle to
upper ruling classes with access to resources and state power structures. The main actors
include university professors, departmental legislators, NGO lawyers and activists,
successful entrepreneurs and local politicians.
Using the environmental protections of Law 99 and 1382, the Committee for the
Defense of Water and the Santurbán Páramo began formally organizing against the mine
in 2010. As civil coalitions began to form against the mining concession in Santander, it
was not just physical contamination that was important, but the idea of contamination
that elicited cross-sector, widespread public indignation. Water’s importance, both
materially and discursively, became key in mobilizing a critical mass of citizens to
protest the mine. Santander residents viewed the threat the Canadian company posed to
their water supply as an affront, not only to public health and natural patrimony, but also
to the very terms of their citizenship. The Comité had sufficient power and capacity to
contest the state and the terms of the 2001 Mining Code that claimed to protect the
environment and the public health of urban citizens.
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3.1.2 Comité and definition of sustainability
It was evident from my numerous interviews of members of the Comité that their
definition of sustainability is firmly rooted in an environmental conservation ethic that
seeks to protects the páramo and its watershed above all else. The leading members of the
Comité who has initiated research about the páramo and its watershed included
academics and experts in geochemistry, hydrogeology, and environmental science.
Numerous entities including the Red Cross, Green Peace, and the Humboldt Institute
have shown that effects of climate change are already accelerating the shrinkage of
Páramo wetland areas. A study undertaken by the Colombian Ministry of the
Environment determined that as much as 56 percent of the lands could be gone due to
rising temperatures by the year 2050. (MAVDT 2001)
I repeatedly heard from experts on páramo biology that Colombian páramo
lands are unique and some of the youngest in the world and that only certain areas in
Peru may be similar. Therefore, no one is really certain how the páramo would react if
it were perforated by large tunnels. For this reason, the Comité has based itself legally
in the principle of precaution. Considered one of the fundamental pillars of
sustainable development and the duty to protect the environment, the principle of
precaution was established in Law 99 of 1993, and based on the reformed
Constitution of 1991. The Law states that social and economic development of the
country should be based on universal principles of sustainable development according
to the Declaration of Rio de Janeiro of June 1992 regarding the Environment and
Development. The law goes on say that environmental policies shall be based on
scientific investigation. Further, environmental authorities and private entities will
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apply the principle of precaution when there is a risk of serious, irreversible damage.
In such case, the lack of scientific certainty should not be used as a reason to postpone
the adoption of effective measures to impede environmental degradation (Lora 2011).
3.2 Páramo Residents:
According to the Humboldt Institute, the Santander páramo is primarily organized by a
‘local bloc’ consisting of all the mayors of the provinces of Soto Norte, their municipal
councils, civic representatives of small-holder mining and the farming and livestock
community that are demanding their right to work. This group has proposed that the
protective boundary of the Páramo correspond with that which delimits the regional park
of Santurbán, which was declared in 2013 by the departmental environmental authority,
CDMB, amidst great controversy. For this group, their history, lifestyle, and livelihoods
are not being sufficiently considered in environmental management decisions. They are
willing to be held accountable for their own environmental security and that of the city of
Bucaramanga, but within certain limits. Their proposals imply an agreed upon transition
that defines their commitment to contribute to the common good based on long, complex
discussions and collective learning (Bautista 2013).
To the extent that the discourse of the Comité claimed to speak for all of
Santander but was dominated by local power-holders, I found multiple examples of an
absence of voice and representation of the páramo residents themselves. If anything, their
interests were voiced through large-scale mining companies or the regional authorities
that claimed to represent their opinions, abilities and/or best interests.
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3.2.1 Research limitations as findings:
Specifically because of the limitations I mentioned in the Methodology section, I
was not able to offer as comprehensive a portrayal of the community members and their
perspectives as I had intended and stated in my initial research goal. However, those
obstacles may be seen as a significant finding in themselves. Therefore, to illustrate the
aforementioned absence, it is worth detailing several of the significant limitations I
encountered which made it difficult to interview rural residents.
3.2.1a Pre-electoral political moment: When I arrived in June of 2014, the decision
about the demarcation and terms of the Páramo boundaries that had been promised
months earlier had been postponed. Many participants speculated that it was political
maneuvering on the part of the incumbent candidate that did not want to alienate any
voting blocs with a decision.
3.2.1b Security: After interviewing several participants in the Páramo, I learned of the
possible presence of guerilla groups in the area. Though it was unlikely that they were
acting in an overt manner, given the proximity to the exposed gold vein, there was high
probability such actors were keeping the area under surveillance. Though it was also
unlikely that they would have caused any problems for me, given the potential difficulty
it could have caused possible participants, I decided not to continue with my planned
interviews.
3.2.1c Paranoia: Given the difficulties of gathering first hand interviews, I contacted a
local social scientist who had been contracted by a mining multinational in the area. She
was supposed to interview páramo residents to use in the social analysis that must be
included in the Environmental Assessment report companies file with the Ministry of the

	
  

31	
  

Environment in order to undertake exploratory activities. Because she lived in another
city in Colomia, she agreed to talk to me on the phone. However, after a short time and
given the nature of the questions I was asking her, she became resistant to answering the
questions, noting her fear that her phone line could be intercepted.
3.2.1d Base line demographics: As mentioned in the Methodologies section, my initial
interviews with a project official from the Humboldt Institute revealed that the
Colombian National Statistics Department (DANE) does not gather official census data
for communities about 3000ft. The justification, according to the Humboldt interview is
that the state considers such communities “too marginal.”
3.2.1e Unclear agendas: As I spoke with one group of four farmers from the region, they
told me that their communal council had drawn up their own development plans. One
farmer told me that they had contracted an environmental/social foundation from the city
to do a community study and survey. Based on this, they proposed a plan to the regional
environmental authority for voluntary relocation if the government would pay a fair price
for their properties.
Though I was a little surprised by the apparent readiness to relocate from their
home lands, the news seemed hopeful to me as an example of a completely locally-driven
effort. I asked another person I met from another nearby community about the
foundation contracted to do the study. He indicated that it was a company that the gold
company had hired. When I was back in Bogota, I contacted the foundation directly and
asked for a meeting to discuss the general context of Santurbán, never mentioning the
specific work or connections they had to the region. After many unanswered emails,
phone calls, and unfruitful trips to their office, the office director finally responded that
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she was unable to discuss the case with me as the work they had done had been
contracted by a third party and contained a confidentiality clause. When I mentioned the
story to a contact from an organization in Bucaramanga they said that it aligned with
information they were receiving that the gold company was trying to buy properties in
other areas of the páramo to access sub-soil or even water rights. There was no way for us
to verify the story in the short amount of time that I was there. However, accounts from
various sources suggested that it could have been part of the company’s contingency plan
should environmental regulation result in obstructed access to mine certain areas: their
strategy in such a case would be to get the government to pay for the relocation of
families so the company could then buy up their land, and in this way maintain their
presence close to that expansive gold vein.
Based on the few conversations I was able to have with those that live in
Santurbán, whether they were farmers, small-scale miners, or employed by a
multinational mining company, the páramo residents seemed most immediately
concerned about their economic stability and employment, and their ability to continue
living in region. Representatives from California and Vetas cite the fact that their
hundreds year old economic and social history have made mining an integral part of their
identity. Residents of other towns such as Matanza and Surata, are traditionally small
scale farmers and livestock owners. They have benefited little from mining but depending
on where environmentally protective boundaries are drawn, and how they are enforced,
their residence and livelihoods could become as equally uncertain as those of the miners.
3.2.2 Páramo residents and definition of sustainability
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I believe the aforementioned limitations speak to the lack of cohesive
representation and substantive characterizations of Páramo residents’ opinions and
desires. Therefore, it is impossible for me to adequately answer how Páramo residents
may be defining sustainability. Under current territorial and economic governance, as
objects of management rather than actors with voices, their definitions of sustainability
are foregrounded by other, more powerful actors.
Currently, Páramo residents are unsure of how protective demarcation will be
drawn and how policy and administrative decisions will affect their lives. This limbo in
some way mirrors and arises from the internal incoherency of public policy. For example,
the Mining Code of 2001 established mining as an activity of “public goods,” while
resolution 1015 of 2011, which denied Zstar the environmental license on the precept of
sustainable development, acknowledges páramos as “public goods” to be protected as
such. This contradiction highlights how sustainable development discourse allows for the
“commoditization of nature” making it “vulnerable to the volatility of markets and
corporate profitability” (Rivera-Sotelo 2012).
The United Nations Convention on Environment and Development was ratified in
Stockholm in 1972. This agreement was expanded in the Brundtland Report, a report by
the United Nations Commission on Environment and Development in 1987. These
documents enshrine “development that meets the needs of present generations without
compromising the ability of future generation to meet their own needs” (World
Commision…2001). In his recent book-length analysis of mining policy in Colombia,
Julio Fierro considers how policies of the United Nations Sustainable Development
Commission actually belie the rationality of sustainability. The United Nation
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recommends that the ‘international community’ help the Global South to reap the
maximum benefit of their mineral resources and mitigate environmental and social harms
through proper management. Fierro suggests that the UN’s discourse around sustainable
extractive activities is logically erroneous—that by definition, the extraction of nonrenewable natural resources can never be sustainable (Fierro 2012).
Under Colombia’s current National Development Plan that supersedes locallydriven land zoning (Ordenamiento Territorial) the national government is able to impose
its large-scale mining agenda upon the decisions of local communities. So under this
legal framework, community understandings and definitions of what is or is not
sustainable will continue to be subsumed into dominant discourses that facilitate
powerful economic interests.
The Humboldt Institute describes the public framing of the central debate as one
between grassroots urban-based, environmental activists colliding with transnational
capital in the form of a Canadian gold company. In this understanding, environmental
concerns are that of the many (urban area) vs. that of the few (páramo). This utilitarian
argument also underpins the Comité’s justifications and demands for environmental
protections. In the following section, I argue that a more nuanced understanding is
needed of the complex interplay between power, obligation and agency that are framing
the debate and authoring alternatives. The state is not a monolithic entity at the service of
private capital, but one that is fragmented, influenced by and at the service of competing
interests. Similarly, environmental protection, as it is proposed by both civil society and
state entities, does not always and only negate the interests of private capital (even in the
case of the Comité), but in multiple instances collaborates with it.
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Figure 3. Actors: Páramo Residents

3.3 Analysis of Actors:
In this section I argue that it may be more useful to analyze eventual outcomes
and possibilities for Páramo residents by considering that the central issue in the
delimitation debate not only as ecosystem preservation, but instead as a question of
governance. As introduced in the review of literature, governance presents a realm in
which a consideration of environmental justice that seeks equitable outcomes and access
for those most affected could be considered. Framing the debate as simply the needs of
the many verses the needs of the few, eclipses the underlying class interests. Jessop’s
discussion of transnational economic and social processes suggests that it is more useful
to understand the way different forms of private capital interact with and may ultimately
orient actions of institutions and citizen groups at different scales. This is an illuminating
departure point for understanding the overlay of actors in Santurbán and how they
converge and diverge. As such, transnational mining in Colombia can be considered as an
imbedded accumulation regime. In his discussion of globalization, Jessop acknowledges
that such regimes are not necessarily monolithic entities or unilateral processes, but rather
are articulated through a hugely extended network of locations and actors. Therefore
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development occurs unevenly over space and time (Jessop 2002, 114). This however, is
not to say that powerful interests do not align and converge – on the contrary.
Strategically, globalization refers to various actors’ attempts to globally coordinate their
activities in different functional subsystems. Jessop refers to such strategic coordination
as “metasteering” (2002, 115). As discussed in the Review of Literature, the large-scale
Mining agenda in Colombia represents an international economic hegemony. Even
though the net economic, social and environmental impacts of large-scale transnational
mining are arguably negative to Colombia, it favors the industry in ways that don’t seem
ideological but rather a common move toward progress and modernization. In his
discussion of globalization, Jessop notes that implementation of international hegemonic
projects is articulated through a hugely extended network of laws, agreements locations
and actors, not monolithic entities or unilateral processes.
3.3.1 International/National Mining Agenda
Powerful interests and agendas are able to globally coordinate their activities in different
levels of governance and subsystems. Jessop refers to such strategic coordination as
“metasteering.” This kind of macro-level coordination has established large-scale mining
as the hegemonic order. The example of the Canadian mining operation and its influence
over the Colombian state is an example of such macro-level coordination. I believe it can
be seen in the following: the role the United Nations has played in determining mining as
a means of sustainable development (Fierro 2012), International Finance Corporation (the
World Bank’s private lending arm) in financing X Oro; the United States in heavily
financing the Colombian military, which offers military accompaniment to transnational
mining operations, the Canadian International Development Agency, which participated
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heavily in influencing reforms that led to the 2001 liberalized Colombian mining code,
and the Colombian presidential administration along with associated ministries that favor
mining as means of national development and modernization. Jessop suggests that these
shifts are also associated with the blurring of the state’s boundaries and its growing
involvement in decentralized societal guidance strategies rather than centralized
overbearing coordination (Jessop 1993).

Figure 4. Actors: International/ National

On this point, I think it may be even more useful to view the state’s role not
specifically as societal guidance but one that is in a constant process of negotiation
between capital and citizens. For instance, the 2001 Mining Code designates in situ
mineral rights as the property of the “state” and not the “nation” of Colombia (O’Connor
and Montoya 101). Before 2001, as citizens (i.e. members of the “nation”) small-scale
miners were allowed to mine on public lands. But the reformed mining code made the
state the sole arbiter and broker of private appropriation of minerals. This left small scale
miners more vulnerable to expropriation by paramilitary groups that specifically target
unlicensed miners (O’Connor and Montoya 2010) or through the legalization of
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concessions that were usually sold to multinational mining firms (O’Connor and
Montoya 2010). The end result of this had dramatic impact on the social property
relations of production in Colombia’s gold fields by subordinating small-scale mining to
the interests of large firms. As Jessop notes, one association of the open-ended dynamic
of economic growth in a capitalist state is the need for reconfigurations when the
trajectory of accumulation encounters resistance, and is marked by “waves of
territorialization, deterritorialization and reterritorialization” as prevailing fixes or modes
of governance begin to decompose (Jessop 2002, 19). Understood in this light, the ongoing confusion and vacillation that has marked the Colombian state’s effort to delineate
the boundary and terms of protection in Santurbán seem proportionate. The State must
still attempt (or at least appear to attempt) to rectify a variegated set of interests: urban
and rural citizens’ well-being, nature, private capital and trade relations with Canada.
In the case of Santurbán, globalization is not only at play in the aforementioned
‘metaframework’ but also displays how its processes occur on various spatial scales and
involve complex and “tangled causal hierarchies” (Jessop 2002, 114) rather than a
simple, unilinear, bottom-up or top-down arrangements. An example of this complex
“nesting” of different scales of social organization is the way in which Canadian
company X Oro operates in Santander. Under the banner of “corporate social
responsibility,” X Oro invests in infrastructure and social improvement projects in the
towns where it operates. These private investments substitute for obligations from the
state, making those towns more desirable and in some cases economically and socially
stable than surrounding towns. This outcome allows the company to build a case for
social improvements that the company claims offset other negative environmental and
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social externalities their operations cause to the entire region. These effects are ‘nested’ at
the micro level of California and Vetas and the macro level through the National Mining
Ministry and compliant regional environmental authority.
While such shifts sometimes emerge as products of short-term crisis management
or displacement strategies, they also correspond to long-term structural changes in the
global economy. At stake is not just a series of formal or tactical shifts but also the
practical re-articulation of political capacities. To the extent that the process of
decentralization and reformed land use zoning opened a space for more local
participation in land use planning, the reformed mining code of 2001 recalibrated the
Colombian state’s regulatory role in mandating environmental protection in order to
broker transnational capital. The National Development Plan that promotes large-scale
mining still has precedence over community-driven land-use zoning law (Ordenamiento
Territorial). 5
This apparent vacuum of state power to which the Comité responded, pressured
the centralized state to challenge the departmental environmental authority (CMDB) on
its lax protective demarcation. However, this back and forth between the state and the
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
5	
  On

paper, the lofty goals of the Ley Organica de Ordenamiento Terretorial would appear to
empower municipalities and local communities with more say in how their lands are used. This process is
meant to give more power to local entities to guide and shape which resources are made available for
development. The Colombian government has started to define a process to identify areas necessary to
maintain “strategic ecosystems” for the well-being of the entire country. It does so by seeking to protect the
minimum area needed to maintain biodiversity and ecosystem services (Saenz et al 2013).
However, such efforts are at major odds with Article 37 of the Mining Code, which considers it
impossible that regional authorities, sectional or local offices be allowed to establish areas of the national
territory where mining cannot be undertaken (“Municipios no podran decider…2013). Decree 0934 of
May 2013 that revised article 37 of the mining code, established that mining planning is not part of
territorial planning, and as such, cannot be regulated by territorial entities. So this is to say, that as much as
a municipality is opposed to mining activity, it cannot do anything to prevent the National Government
gives over the mining titles in those areas. The National Development Plan (Law 1450 of 2011) establishes
mining authorities in charge of writing and issuing the Mining Plan (Plan de ordenamiento Minero). The
Minister of Mining also insists that the decree should not come as any surprise to mayors since it is already
established in the revised Mining Code of 2011” (“Municipios no podran decider…2013).	
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social movement had the net effect of eclipsing rural residents most immediately affected
by decisions.
3.3.2 Comité:

Figure 5. Actors: Comité

When the urban movement of Bucaramanga learned of the CDMB’s declaration
of the Natural Regional Park it countered with the following assessment:
The 11.700 hectáreas of the Natural Regional Park of Santurbán only protects 18%
of the páramo; it leaves out el sub-páramo, high Andean forest, lake systems,
peatlands and aquifers at a height of 3,400 meters above the elevation established for
moorland in the eastern range (3,000 m); protecting the interests of multinational
mining companies, especially X Oro (Grey Star); does not protect groundwater,
leaving 82% of the free territory for underground mining or as desired by
multinationals. This little park does not guarantee the conservation and preservation
of water that the people of the Metropolitan Area of Bucaramanga and surrounding
areas need. (Communiqué, January 2013)
The Communiqué goes on to assess that “Those most affected by the Natural Regional
Park decision, besides the residents of the Bucaramanga Metropolitan Area, are also
artisanal miners and campesinos that have settled inside the National Regional Park and
those that are close to the large scale mines that would have to abandon their lands.”
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The assessment of the CDMB’s “deception and manipulation” (Communiqué,
January 2013) over the inadequacy of the protective designation concludes by calling on
civil society in Santander to act on four points. These points become the central
organizing points around which the Comité works:
•

Demand the immediate suspension of all multinational mining activity in
Santurbán and Almorzadero páramos, productive ecosystems which provide water
for human consumption.

•

Demand that the pertinent regional, state, and national regulatory bodies comply
with their duty to protect the environment and defend ecosystems that provide
water and life, and demand accountability for having ceded this water source to
mining multinationals.

•

Demand that the Governor of Santander, Richard Aguilar Villa, invest in social
programs and infrastructure in the Soto Norte province and not transfer that
responsibility to international companies.

•

Publicly demonstrate to the national government and environmental authorities
the societal rejection of the plans multinational mining exploitation have
developed in areas that provide water and life for Northeast Colombia.
Both the symbolic and material importance of water provided the impetus to unite

usually divergent factions against the corrosive, imperialistic Canadian extractive
projects. As I interviewed members of the Comité, biases against fellow members on
opposite extremes of the political spectrum became apparent. Overall, however, members
worked together to unify the region. For example, the President of the Water Authority, a
wealthy, local business owner worked closely with the Water Authority Union and
agreed to use water bills as canvasing tools—one of, if not the most, effective means to
distributing their message about the imminent threat that mining in the Páramos would
accelerate water contamination and scarcity in the city. The Comité was also able to
garner support from two vocal and respected members of the Santander Legislature who
stridently worked to make the encroachment of Canadian capital on the Santurbán
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páramo a departmental issue (personal communication with Departmental Senator
Esmelbac). As previously mentioned, I was able to speak with several páramo residents
before I decided to abandon the plan of interviewing more (see Methodology). A
common thread among Páramo residents I was able to interview was an experience of
stigmatization during visits to Bucaramanga --such as taxis refusing to stop for them,
doctor’s offices refusing to wait on them —which occurred when a Bucaramanga citizen
learned they were from the páramo, and therefore assumed that they were complicit with
large-scale mining. It can be said, then, that the Comité as a type of counter-hegemonic
bloc proved itself capable of exercising political and intellectual resistance against the
international economic hegemony that bolsters large-scale mining. Implied in the
Comité’s demands on the Colombian Government (which will be discussed in the
following section) is an alternative economic strategy and state project that derails
neoliberal decentralization and demands the removal of the multinational mining
companies from the region. Their alternative calls upon the Governor to directly invest in
the towns of the Páramo through a selective intervention.
The core group of organizers from the Comité are environmentalists and
intellectuals, mainly from private universities, that proposed an alternative to the
hegemonic project of globalized mining in their department. The initial organizers of the
movement were a smaller group of members of the larger social movement in Santander.
As information spread and the imminent danger to the water supply became more
apparent, members with more political sway began to join. Previously, these actors did
not necessarily identify with a larger social or environmental movement, but instead
included members of the business class, such as the president of the Bucaramanga
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Chamber of Commerce, the president of the Water Authority and other members of
Santander society. As Jessop notes, “extra-economic” themes are frequent means for
social mobilization that side-step class and institutional orders. As such an example, the
Comité is a movement with its own politics of identity, with its own modes of domination
and exclusion, and their own politics of identity and difference. Represented in this way,
it ostensibly has no class belonging. Rather, their political sway and power to mobilize
relies on a contextually-determined and thus hard to calculate, “provisional- class
relevance.” (Jessop 2002, 32). Since members of this elite class did not have large tracts
of land for productive projects in the Páramo area under debate, it was in their best
interests to save the integrity of water for the city with little regard for the implications
that environmental protections and restrictions could have for rural residents’ productive
and life projects, while bolstering their own positions of power within Municipal and
Departmental politics. In fact, one of the most vocal protestors was the president of the
National Federation of Businesspeople (FENALCO) and former chair of the Chamber of
Commerce, who parlayed his successes by making visible and eventually halting open-pit
mining as a platform to run for departmental legislator. FENALCO’s main goal is to
“speak on behalf of commerce, defend private initiatives and freedom of the market […]
with the overall goal of modernization … and internationalization of the Colombian
economy” (Fenalco 2014). Additionally, this businessperson formed a spur group of the
Comité called the Civic Movement of Citizen Consciousness. Using the language of
‘civic engagement,’ this movement’s ostensible aim is reaching out to “apathetic blocks
of voters and grass roots leaders that have been deceived by traditional populist politics”
(“Nace el Moviemiento Civico…” 2011). The group holds meetings and leads actions in
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conjunction with the Comité to educate about public health and natural resource issues in
the city. They have received wide local and national media coverage, and formed
alliances with other business elites and local legislators. Though the Comité is a counterhegemonic movement, it is one that is led by local business elites. The Comité organizer
and leader of FENALCO is advancing his political campaign on environmental grounds,
also embraces and furthers a neoliberal ideology. As such, he is able to conflate issues of
public health and environmentalism, yet still further private capital interests. As such, his
efforts appear “extra-economic” (non-class), while he is also, I would argue, shaping
local social/civic influence and discourse, while still decrying ‘imperialistic capitalist’
mining operations in the department. The Colombian state had little option but to respond
to the Comité’s pressure and at least oppose X Oro’s extractive license.
As Jessop notes, resistance movements to capitalism “often involve conflicts over
the very principle of accumulation itself rather than over class interests within
capitalism”(2002, 32). The very motto of the Comité, “Water, not gold,” is an example of
how the Comité calls into question what, under the Mining Code of 2001, amounts to
Global North/South exploitation and the accumulation of gold, clearly a luxury item, in
an industry that pays minimal royalties and produces little value-added income for
Colombian industry. This movement, however, has enabled individuals of the urban elite
to consolidate influence. Additionally, it has been a project under which urban-based
NGOs that are funded by European foundations have been able to justify budget
increases for Comité campaign work. Furthermore, the hegemony/counter hegemony
tension at play in the delimitation debate, does not address larger issues of class
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inequality or the vulnerability of rural citizens as do numerous other social organizations
and movements, both nationally and in the department of Santander.
The most central players of the Comité, considered in light of “class relevance,”
evoke an environmentalism defined by urban scholars and market technocrats. As such,
they give primacy to expert knowledge over local knowledge (Aparicio and Blaser 2008).
The question then arises: Beyond, counter-hegemony, what kind of social movement is
the Comité? Though a vast literature exists on social movements, for the purposes of this
paper, I use Arturo Escobar’s definition of ecologically based movements that explicitly
constructs a political strategy for the defense of territory. In Escobar’s view, social
movements that struggle for environmental protection, land-rights, etc. must bring an
awareness that “culture and identity are linked to particular places and territories”
(Escobar 1998, 60).
Escobar’s analysis is useful in interrogating the political space the Comité has
delineated in the regional and national debate over environmental protection. In
Escobar’s discussion of locally based environmental movements, actors coalesce around
the idea that ‘biodiversity’ is a hegemonic construct. Activists in these movements
acknowledge that such discourse may commoditize nature, but can open a space for
culturally based forms of development. Such locally-based projects could counteract
ethnocentric and extractivist tendencies (Escobar 1998). In these terms, the Comité has
done much against extractivist tendencies but not against the ethnocentrism that critically
interrogates cultural forces and subject positions. The Comité has been a struggle to
consolidate a counter-hegemonic project that prioritizes environmental/public health
values over the logic of extractive capitalism. But as a whole, it has not challenged
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permanent capitalist expansion. Even though it is firmly anti-extractivist, it is based on
what political ecologist Paul Robinson calls a “conservation and control” rationale. Using
such arguments, control of resources has been taken from local producers by
implementing efforts to preserve an Edenic “nature.” In this process state and global
interests that typically seek to preserve the “environment” disable local systems of
livelihood, and socio-political organization (Robinson 180). That is to say, the Comité
does not consider the embedded class and cultural differences that condition their access
to decision-making power in the region, a power that may come at the cost of the
interests of Páramo residents.
The Comité’s priorities, so firmly grounded in urban well-being and state driven
solutions, do not contemplate local, culturally-based forms of development in the Páramo
to counteract the extractive projects. By simply calling on the state to invest in
infrastructure and social programs in the Páramo, they elide discussion of class. As a
reformist movement, they attempt to elevate the role of the state to act in line with their
own values. In this manner, the Comité was able to rally support from all sectors of the
city. However, to the extent that the Comité is driven by and furthers elite class interests,
the Comité could be said to constitute a kind of hegemonic bloc. When they contest the
regional environmental authority’s declaration of the park line that protected Angostura
mine site, they are calling on the Colombian state for social protections inscribed within a
Keynesian welfare state.
In the neoliberal era, on points of human and environmental rights, states concede
to enter into negotiation with ‘civil society,’ both of which use liberal, rights-based
discourse. By focusing on the obligations of states, the contemporary human rights

	
  

47	
  

establishment largely leaves out the responsibilities private and transnational agents to
protect human rights. Human rights discourses stress economic liberty, which in practice
results in individual appropriation of and control over economic resources at the expense
of equality of access and wellbeing. (Charvet and Kaczynska-Nay 11). The Comité,
implicitly calls upon the state to recognize that land and water are not commodities, but
are collective holdings. However, by essentially eliding class issues from their actions
and strident discourse against the state’s extractive development agenda in Santander, the
Comité does not go as far as it might to consider the voices and relevance of the Páramo
residents that are most immediately affected, and may even play a role in stigmatizing
residents as non-moderns.
My aim is not to negate the important role the Comité has played in countering
the globally coordinated Mega-mining economic hegemony in Santander. However,
using Fraser’s (1995) distinction, I argue that responses to social injustice that only affirm
a group’s status or entitlements within an existing order must be distinguished from
remedies that transform society in ways that abolish underlying generative mechanisms
of injustice. Comité members were also opposed to joining the Mesa de Trabajo on
ideological grounds, citing a refusal to be coopted by the governor’s office. However the
Comité’s counter-hegemonic actions may be, ironically and in some ways, establishing a
class hegemony in the department.
A final and important point to note about the Comité, is that though it is led by a
unified group of actors with the means to mobilize a large group of citizens, amass
political capital, and influence political clout, it would be untrue to depict it as a uniform
entity composed of members with homogeneous ideologies, subject positions, and
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agendas. In the interview process, I did hear several accounts from people from member
organizations that were critical in one way or the other of how the Comité was operating.
Several I spoke with were indeed disturbed by the process of stigmatization urban
residents projected on rural residents. I even spoke with Comité members who grew up in
the páramos and came from small-scale mining families, later to become Páramo
defenders. These people, though always critical of X Oro’s presence and the
government’s lack of will to change mining policies at a national level, perceived a need
for a better process of dialogue between the Comité and Páramo residents – unmitigated
by the multinationals in the region, or other powerbrokers such as local mayors.
3.3.3 Mesa de Trabajo:

Figure 6. Actors: Mesa de Trabajo (Working Group)

As described above, the Mesa is comprised of national, local, and regional state
representatives, along with the United Nations Development Program, local
environmental NGOs, and professors with the goal of designing and executing
sustainable “life options” for the resident of the Páramos. The Hoja de Ruta, or roadmap
of alternative economic options is being developed specifically in conjunction with the
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Santander Governor’s Office. As will be discussed in the following section, the plan in its
current form hinges on promoting a “culture of sustainability” among páramo residents
through education, environmental service payments, and other productive alternatives to
mining and farming like ecotourism” (“Hoja de Ruta” 2014). Payments for Ecological
services – or payments for watershed services- is a managed scenario in which the
downstream water users who benefit from a clean and regular supply pay upstream
landowners to adopt more environmentally-friendly land use practices.
The Specific objectives of the Hoja de Rutas are composed of the following:
•

Strengthen, articulate and develop institutionalization toward "Sustainable Local
Management" of the municipalities influenced by the delimitation of Santurbán

•

Consolidate the area of rural sustainable development for the páramo of
Santurbán and its area of influence

•

Design and execute sustainable life projects for the families involved in the area
of influence of the Santurbán páramo

•

Consolidate populations in clusters with a sustainable focus

•

Design new meeting spaces for understanding and interaction between the rural
communities of the páramo and the urban beneficiaries of payments for ecological
services provided by the páramo of Santurbán
Tasked with finding ways to preserve the páramo, the mandate of the Mesa is to

work toward the ‘general economic interest’ of those who live there. However, as
explained in the following paragraph, concealed and vested economic interests in ecotourism and green capitalism opportunities could be embedded in and to some extent,
driving such proposed institutionalization. Such questions raise speculation about the
inception of what Jessop calls an “economic hegemony:” a given “accumulation strategy
is the basis for an institutionalized compromise between opposed social forces for
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coordinating, governing or guiding activities within and across different institutional
orders around the pursuit of a particular economic trajectory” (Jessop 30). Read as an
economic hegemony, the work of the Mesa would be guided by specific notions about
which identities and interests can be combined within a general interest as well as setting
the spatial and temporal horizons.
This ‘general interest,’ seeks to create more “institutionality toward local
sustainable development” (Hoja de Rutas) and payments for environmental services (to
be discussed in the following section). Though it is not made explicit in the document,
there have been rumors about ecotourism development in the area as well. Recently an
“alternative plan for development” was drafted by several of the mayors of the páramo
towns with backing from the National Tourism Office. It sought to set-up several private
businesses to create a theme-park, offering visitors the opportunity to “Be a miner for a
day”(“Mineria y turismo” 2014). It is worth noting, however, the current governor of
Santander has strong ties to tourism interests in the department (‘Los Aguilar y los lazos
del turismo en Santander” Sept 2014). Though I found no first-hand evidence, several
people from social and environmental organizations mentioned that it was possible that
Governor Aguilar and his family had interests in such projects in the Páramo. The extent
that the institutional order created around the Mesa’s efforts “colonize the lifeworld”
(Jessop 2002) of the Páramo, depends on the outcome of “political and ideological
struggles around political projects and hegemonic visions as well as on the ecological
dominance of the circuit of capital” (Jessop 2002, 30). That is to say, that to the extent
that Governor Aguilar’s political stronghold and the ‘general economic interests’ of
regional tourism are mutually reinforcing (“Los Aguilar y los lazos del turismo en
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Santander” Sept 2014)	
  asymmetrical accumulation and regulation could easily go hand in
hand.
“Accumulation strategies involve efforts to resolve conflicts between the needs of
capital in general and particular capitals by constructing an imagined ‘general economic
interest’ that will always and necessarily marginalize some capitalist interests” (Jessop
30). It is difficult to quantify the extent to which private economic interests may be a
motivating force behind the Governor’s management efforts in alternative economic
projects in Santurbán Páramo. As noted previously, the pre-electoral political context that
motivates the Santos administration to neither alienate the small farmer voting block nor
the environmentalists set the effort in motion on the part of the National Ministry of the
Environment. The possible regional economic interests at play may diverge from Santos’
overall discourse and ‘general economic interest,’ which names mining a benefit to the
nation as a whole. The Comité’s pressure, may indeed leave little option for the National
Government than to designate the Páramo as protected and conceivably deny X Oro it’s
environmental license—space enough for the governor’s office to define the ‘general
economic interest’ of the region as alternative, eco-friendly development. However, if
not situated in an democratic space of governance that allow adequate levels of
transparency and oversight, the Governor’s development interests could easily
overshadow possibilities for real environmentally sustainable economic development
possibilities for the páramo.
3.3.4 Conclusion:
Under neoliberal structuring, the Colombian state recalibrated its regulatory role
in order to broker transnational capital. In the case of Santurbán, this created a vacuum to
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which the Comité was prompted to respond. As a counter-hegemonic movement the
Comité has succeeded in holding the state accountable for its protection over the
environment. However, the tension produced in the hegemony/counter hegemony
struggle has also eclipsed the needs and agency of rural residents most immediately
affected by decisions. Furthermore, in the case of transnational mining in Santurbán
páramo, social protest, though effective in helping protect a threatened ecosystem, has
exacerbated a divide between urban and rural residents. Instead of opening a region-wide
participatory space that accounts for multiple conceptions of environmental subjects and
identities, the urban-based environmental coalition focuses on reformist/regulatory
political pressure.
Civil society’s interactions with the state in this case are itself a tangled hierarchy
at work in both the Comité and the Mesa. Just as the state is in a constant negotiation
with the interests of capital and its citizens, so too is civil society rife with ambiguity. As
Jessop notes, it is both the site where colonizing forces seek to integrate into an
institutional order, and also the site of struggles to resist and roll back such attempts in
defense of interests such as the environment (Jessop 32). The way that environmentalism
is evoked and at work in both the Comité and the Mesa—be it through advancement of
political class and local business positions or ecotourism and other forms of green
capitalism and international financing—can be seen to collaborate with private capital to
the same extent it may be seen to oppose it.
The following chapter considers the following question about this dynamic: How
might these ambiguities both limit and open opportunities for Páramo residents?
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Chapter 4: Critique of Proposed Alternatives
Based on the prior analysis of actors, in this section I will compare and contrast
the Comité’s organizing points and the Mesa de Trabajo’ proposed Hoja de Rutas. I will
consider the implicit and explicit alternative development models being proposed to
evaluate their feasibility and assess and propose possible outcomes for Páramo residents.
Though development and sustainability are defined differently and contested in manifold
ways by each actor, the central debate coalesces around the possibility of Payments for
Ecological Services (PES) to Páramo residents. PES programs seek to capture part of the
benefits derived from environmental services (such as clean water) and channel them to
natural resource managers. Since these managers are usually the local residents who
generate these services, the aim is to increase their incentive toward conservation.
(Pagiola 2005). In many cases, managers suffer opportunity costs by not undertaking
conservation. In Santurbán, this may be true for small-scale farmers, but PES would have
to be exceptionally high to generate opportunity costs for those with access to gold to
forego mining.
4.1 Mesa de Trabajo- chronology and background of Hoja de Rutas
Months before the presidential election of June 2014, the National Ministry of the
Environment and Agriculture as well as the Colombian Institute of Rural Development
(INCODER), created a “working group” along with Santander Departmental government
and the mayors of the town in Soto Norte and towns affected in the department of Norte
de Santander. The new working group was a response to the outcry by a large group of
onion farmers in Norte de Santander, in the adjacent Páramo of Berlin who will also be
affected by the delimitation debate. Its purpose was to facilitate the national government
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offices’ work with state and local governments in order to jointly develop guidelines for
territorial zoning (i.e. delimitation) of the páramo. The stated purpose of the work group
is to “guide the development of productive projects, family farming and restructuring
(read “modernizing’) to gradually phase out productive activities that generate high
impact to the ecosystem.” (Ministeros de Agricultura y …” August 4, 2014).
The United Nations Development Department along with Bucaramanga-based
environmental organization, joined the process and formally began writing a guiding
document with the title: “Road map for the formulation of a strategy that guides the
implementation of sustainably oriented life options for the communities involved in the
delimitation of the Santurbán Páramo.” It includes a promise to devise a strategy for
ecological service payments for the páramo residents (dubbed “planters of the páramo,” a
play on “planters of peace”).
Driven primarily by national, departmental, and regional state officials, the Mesa
also incorporates the United Nations, Bogotá and Bucaramanga based academics and
NGOs. Their primary goal as stated in the “hoja de rutas” is to “strengthen, articulate and
develop the institutionality of the municipal areas of Santurbán toward ‘Local Sustainable
Management” (Gestion Local Sostenible). The contents and implications of the ‘hoja de
rutas’ will be discussed in depth in the following section. The mix of actors involved and
potentially involved in the Mesa, though generally connected to government, make it
more challenging to characterize from the perspective of one institutional order.
However, the efforts undertaken can easily be said to represent an effort of
metagovernance (see Review of Literature).
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Dr. Cardenas was asked by the National Environmental Minister to facilitate a
workshop among various stakeholders, from campesinos to mining company
representatives in a “mesa de dialogo,” in an attempt to resolve the social and economic
conflicts involved in the páramo delimitation debate. The workshop included an activity
predicated on the idea that if everyone put all their game pieces in play, everyone would
double their winnings, whereas, if people reserved pieces for themselves, everyone loses.
The pivotal point, as Dr. Cardenas explained to me, around which everyone could agree
was around the importance of protecting water. This point of (at least theoretical)
consensus was no doubt vital to stress to all actors involved. Dr. Cardenas also told me
that his discussion with the Environmental Minister regarding how the páramo
delimitation line is drawn and protection enforcement pursued hinged on benefiting the
needs of the many over the needs of the few. So that could mean that the farmers
protesting in the Páramo de Berlin (also affected by delimitation), because they
comprised a larger population, would be considered with more weight. This also came at
a moment before the National Presidential election, when the threat of continued protest
by onion farmers in the Páramo de Berlin, backed by the agricultural movement,
represented a risk for the incumbent presidential candidate Juan Manuel Santos.
4.2 Payments for Ecological Services:
PES is a market-based approach to conservation financing based on the twin
principles that, on the one hand, those who benefit from environmental services should
pay for them, and, on the other, that those who contribute to generating these services
should be compensated for providing them (Pagiola et al., 2005). For example, users of
clean water should pay upstream land users. The approach aims at implementing
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mechanisms to facilitate transactions between service users and service providers that are
in both parties’ interests, “internalizing what would otherwise be an externality” (Pagiola
2007). In other words, through PES the invisible hand ostensibly turns the tragedy of the
commons toward conservation. Institutions such as the World Bank have encouraged the
PES approach because of its presumed ability to generate new financing for conservation,
it is likely to be sustainable since it depends on the mutual self-interest of service users
and providers and not on the “whims of government or donor financing,” and it is likely
to be efficient, in that it conserves services whose benefits exceed the cost of providing
them, and does not conserve services when the opposite is true (Pagiola 2007).
The economical and geographical dynamic in the Santurbán environmental
dispute are not unique to the case. In Andean region watersheds, vulnerable groups tend
to be located higher up in the mountains, where land is usually less productive and more
prone to suffer erosion. However, these rural communities are often providers of
environmental services benefiting other groups with a better socioeconomic situation (i.e.
located in downstream urban areas). Hence, PES schemes are also expected to contribute
to wealth redistribution and poverty alleviation that attempts to compel nature to pay for
itself (Kosoy et al.) or at least to balance things out, where from a micro-view less
productive land can been considered from a macro-view more productive.
Others, however, have noted that PES is one example of a mode of ‘accumulation
by conservation’ that “seeks ways to turn the non-material use of nature into capital that
can simultaneously ‘save’ the environment and establish long-term modes of capital
accumulation” (Büscher and Fletcher 2015). Market-driven PES proponents view
watershed services as one of the best emerging markets.
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4.2a Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and PES
A 2006 report prepared for the Canadian International Development Agency
(CIDA) claimed that “hydrological watershed services are “ideally suited to PES markets
because there are direct and obvious users of water in a watershed, meaning that
prospective buyers can be easily identified and targeted” (George et al.). This may seem
like a contradiction: while CIDA identifies water as a great new market, it is also paving
the way for Canadian mining companies that are potentially driving the need for clean
water. Given that over 75 percent of the world’s exploration and mining companies are
headquartered in Canada (Government of Canada 2009), wouldn’t bolstering PES and
watershed services work against the interests of the mining industry? As scholars have
noted, PES fits nicely into the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) approach to
externalities, where mining companies themselves are cast as better equipped to regulate
mining production and clean water, than are nearby small-scale miners.
This is certainly the case in Santurbán. Between the summer of 2013 and 2014, X
Oro made a significant investment in a waste-water treatment plant. X Oro’s head of
biodiversity named this as the most salient achievement of the environmental section of
their CSR program. Some members of the Comité raised questions about the company’s
capacity to install a large-scale answer to the environmental problem regarding the
effectiveness of the treatment plant in eliminating contaminants. Overall, the Comité saw
the treatment plant as a band-aid solution to the underlying problem of tunneling into the
páramo. What good would short-term treatment methods serve when the proposed
extractive method would still destroy soils and vegetal cover in the longer term? But the
treatment plants are cited by the company and the Colombian government as examples of
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large-scale, legal mines that are better equipped and therefore more likely to care for the
environment than what small-scale miners can do in that regard. CIDA’s support for
watershed services are management mechanisms to deal with local peasants: (PES are
typically paid to farmers to stymie erosion, not to miners). As the case of Santurbán
shows, large-scale corporate mines operate outside of the PES debate, so for them, PES
allows for a visible but superficial approach to environmental regulation. In the end it
benefits large-scale mining and is an example of how sustainable development, global
environmental management and neoliberalism discourses intersect and can be mapped
onto existing and emergent policy approaches (Hirons 2011).
4.2b Comité and PES
The Comité rejects the commodification of water and even brought the case of the
stalled delimitation before the United Nations Council on Human Rights. (“Llevan a la
ONU, 2013”). For them, public health and clean accessible water is a fundamental right
that should be protected by the state, rather than market mechanisms. Their posture
rejects the “enclosure of value” (Büscher and Fletcher 2015) with respect to water, which
is seen as public patrimony. As such, the Comité takes a moral stance against the
commodification water. The issue, at least implicitly, is not whether or not the PES
system would actually work to protect the water, i.e. that the market would find the right
price to guarantee the water quality. Rather, the issue is whether it is ethical to place
‘value’ on water at all, simply because of its material proximity and discursive
intersection with gold. If gold prices go up to$1500/oz, do water prices go up in
Bucaramanga to compensate for the opportunity cost? If water is a fundamental right,
how can it be subject to the whims of the market?
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As discussed in the previous section, as one if its four main organizing points, the
Comité calls upon residents of Bucaramanga to “demand that the Governor of Santander,
Richard Aguilar Villa, invest in social programs and infrastructure in the Soto Norte
province and not transfer that responsibility to international companies” (Comité 2013).
In numerous communiqués, the Comité has made its analysis of the precariousness of
livelihoods in the Páramo clear. It identifies the problems as a direct result of Santos’
development plan, in line with that of his predecessor Uribe, which opened the country to
multinational extractive companies. These companies needed to gain the confidence of
communities of Soto Norte and did so by raising false expectations. The Comité blames
multinationals for high levels of unemployment because they raised the population’s
expectations for jobs without yet having the ability to fulfill them. The Comité concludes
that it is “the state’s job to support technological conversion for the communities that
reside in this ecosystem that is the essential water source for more than two million
people” (Comunicado Aug. 27 2014). The Comité’s discursive framing subsumes the
interests and agency of local inhabitants within the overall demand to protect the city’s
water source. Furthermore, it calls for technocratic solutions, as if by providing
alternative, eco-friendly livelihoods, Páramo residents themselves could be
“technologically converted.” Along these lines, we are all ‘upstream’ from someone in
some sense. So is the government responsible for preventing all environmental damage,
or just that damage that affects the downstream urban centers that are home to the
wealthy citizens? Beyond this, there would be a great irony if Governor Aguilar has
private economic interests in the páramo region. In a way, the Comité’s pressure for this
Keynsian style intervention and investment could be functioning to help consolidate the
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governor’s private green capitalism interests and possibly corrupt business deals in the
region.
Though there were initial attempts made by the Committee in 2013 to dialogue
with mayors from Páramo towns regarding alternatives to large and small scale mining in
the region, the effort soon faltered. They have not delineated further options for the area.
On this point, as noted by the Humboldt Institute, the Comité does not evidence a clear
understanding of all the multi-layered/nuanced/complex implications at the level of the
entire páramo, nor of the required transfer of responsibility.
In my discussions with members of the Comité, I raised the possibility of
leveraging a tax on water in Bucaramanga to help subsidize páramo residents to not
undertake productive activities on Páramo land. Members indicated that it was the
State’s responsibility to find and allocate such funds. Their reactions revealed opposition
against the commoditization of water, noting that in Colombia it is not the water itself
that is taxed, but rather the connection and drainage services. In this way, PES could fit
with this mindset in that payments would be made toward the (human) infrastructure
needed to get the water to the city. During interviews, several members of the Comité
recollected a meeting in which departmental government representatives suggested that if
water was so precious to them, then they should be willing to pay for it. The Comité
frames the issue such that if governmental misuse of funds and corruption were remedied,
there would be sufficient funds to invest in infrastructure improvement for páramo towns.
In Colombia, utility payments are based on a sliding scale according to one’s social strata
based on official residency, so wealthier citizens pay more.
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The strength of the Comité lies in its notable success in raising awareness at a
local and national level about the importance of the specific case of Santurbán and
páramo lands in Colombia in general. The pressure they leveraged to halt Grey Star’s
open-pit plan, advanced the national public debate about the impossibilities of expanding
ecological and public health protections in the context of large-scale mining. Their
success in mobilizing visible protests, leveraging local political capital, and so far halting
extractive clearance for X Oro will set the national stage for páramo protection and
delimitation (as the head of biodiversity of X Oro told me: “We are delimitation in
Colombia”). Nationally and internationally, many eyes are watching.
Visibility, however, may not transfer into implementable and sustainable
solutions for Páramo residents. As discussed earlier, the new ideals of social and
environmental justice inherent in Ordenamiento Terretorial (OT) are legally superseded
by mine concession titling. Furthermore, OT’s command-and-control-style natural
resource management focuses on the creation of “Integrated Management
Districts”(DMI) as a means of environmental conservation. DMIs were established under
Law 2811 of 1974 in the National Code of Natural Renewable Resources and
Environmental Protections to set up models of “rational utilization” in areas of
environmental conservation and sustainable development (Torres 78). However,
participants in my study and other scholars highlight the high level of general disregard
and lack of management on the part of the autonomous regional environmental
authorities tasked with DMI oversight (Torres 93). This points to a lack of willingness
and capacity of the relevant central government institutions to effectively enforce
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protected-area decrees. Many projects in conservation and sustainable renewable resource
management have resulted in “paper parks.”
In addition, the Comité’s forceful position that the central government invest in
the region does not consider the possibility that Santander residents as a whole should
help finance, at least in a transitional phase, the payments for ecological services to
Páramo residents6. According to Comité leadership, the central government has
announced an additional tax on citizens to be used for PES programs in various regions.
The Comité is against an additional tax, again citing the prevalence of corruption in
government spending (personal communication). It seems the resolution they offer is that
some corrupt officials should stop misappropriating funds and instead invest them in the
páramo. This answer, however, assumes that there are social systems and governance
structures in place in the páramos that could oversee adequate administration of such
funds. This is not the case. It is still unclear what exactly the Comité believes to be a
“technological conversion” of people in the páramos. It seems to assume that some kind
of ‘sustainable’ mining, farming or other production on páramo lands is possible—an
idea that contrasts with other discursive points about the protection of receding páramo
lands and their ability to capture and provide water for the city.
4.2 Feasibility Study Hoja de Rutas:
The Hoja de Rutas proposed by the Mesa is comprehensive and ambitious in its
scope and content, outlining a plan toward the objective:
Guaranty a life supply of environmental goods and services toward the
sustainable development of the Bucaramanga metro area by generating “life
options” for the communities involved in the delimitation of the Santurbán
Páramo, a strategic ecosystem, and for the protection of biodiversity in Santander.
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The activities to be undertaken revolve primarily around developing and strengthening
the institutionality in páramo towns in order to set up PES for residents. The Hoja de
Rutas also aims to reorient people toward family-scale farming and small-scale mining
cooperatives that could better articulate with market commodity chains. The plan also
outlines social programs, health, education and utilities in which the state should invest,
along with the corresponding authorities and institutions necessary to undertake
execution and fundraising. As it is proposed, this approach tries to redefine the ‘resource
curse’ as a ‘resource blessing’ subsidizing life as good enough to justify not extracting
resources.
The primary organization that is taking a coordinating role in the Mesa de
Trabajo, is a Bucaramanga-based NGO that focuses on environmental protection, food
sovereignty, and strengthening women’s and small-producer community organizations.
They are working closely with the United Nations Development Program in
Bucaramanga. The NGO used to be part of the Comité. However, when its leadership
started to propose working more closely with the United Nations and the Governor, the
Comité adamantly refused. This NGO, then took a leading role in envisioning alternative
development for the residents of Santurbán. As such it is a good example of the overall
shifting paradigm among conservation groups that previously viewed business and
marketization as ‘dirty concepts.’ Now such ideas as the economic valuation of
ecosystems and PES fall under the discourse of sustainable development.
The NGO supports a departmental “Sustainable Development Fund” that would
be financed by various sources. The main economic activities it suggests for area
residents are ecotourism, a rejuvenated small mining sector, development of forest
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systems, and raising livestock. It suggests a mix of governmental co-financing and
appropriation, along with fundraising and donations.
4.3 Obstacles to plan implementation:
Financing the plan will be the main obstacle. The breadth and depth of the plan will
require not only financing the actual environmental service payments, but also the
accompanying social and infrastructure development that is proposed to be divided
among at least ten national and regional agencies and entities. (“Propuesta Para el
Desarollo”…2014). It proposes that in-country financing be obtained for five agencies
plus international fundraising efforts.
4.3a Environmental Fees from Local Environmental Authority and Forest
Conservation Incentive certificates (CIFc): Under a PES rubric these fees, whose
coordination and oversight correspond to the regional environmental authority (CDMB),
entail a complex application process as well several payers. In the case of the CIFc, for
example the CDMB would have to grant an administrative act to applicants (Blanco et al.
2008). However, the distribution of these funds are at the discretion of the National
Council of Economic and Social Policy (CONPES) based on its assessment of need vs.
available resources, and ultimately paid for by the National Agricultural/Livestock
Financing Agency (FINAGRO).
Many, if not all, of the páramo residents I spoke to mentioned mistrust of CDMB
in the region. I was given several concrete examples of failed projects in the area, such as
a pine tree reforestation project sponsored by the CDMB -- one respondent said it was
financed by the International Development Bank-- that ended disastrously. Forest
plantations, especially pine plantations are known to cause high levels of soil acidity and
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are therefore especially harmful to delicate páramo vegetal cover (Hofstede et. al. 1998).
It is likely that residents would be wary of and possibly unwilling to work with CDMB.
Additionally, the multiple administrative channels through which money would have to
flow would likely impede the viability and sustainability of this funding source. Given
such a low level of people’s expectation about the government, it is unlikely that the
CDMB would be in a position to manage a PES scheme which would be put in place.
The proposal names the following funding sources: Bucaramanga Water
Authority, private sector contributions, official funds in the form of National and
Departmental royalties, and international cooperation. The case of Santurbán illustrates
an example of what George et al. cite as one of the biggest challenges for watershed
management and implementation of PES: “integrative frameworks for coordination and
harmonization of government and local community actions.” (18) A significant amount
of oversight and mechanisms for accountability would have to be established before
undertaking the process.
Cognizant of obstacles that official channels could pose, the environmental NGO
that works on the Mesa de Trabajo is also considering a market-based system of
administering PES similar to a system in Antioquia department called banCO2. BanCO2
is a PES strategy that allows businesses, institutions and citizens to calculate and
compensate their carbon footprint through a web portal. It is intended to promote
conservation of natural forests in the region and improve the lives of the local residents
(BanCo2 2014). Particular families would be ‘marketed’ on the web site, and users can
visit profiles of selected campesinos and decide who will receive their payments. In
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essence, it puts the fate of the community members in the hands of well-meaning downstream residents with no promise of consistency, continuity, or equitable distribution.
4.3b Land titling: As environmental services are the result of particular kinds of land
use, payments made under PES programs are payments to land users. This makes the
distribution and ownership patterns of land critical for the ability of PES programs to
alleviate poverty and become self-sustaining (Pagiola et al. 2005). In many rural areas in
Colombia, land ownership is not formalized. Oftentimes lands have been handed down
generationally without formal titling or land occupancy is based upon informal
arrangements between individuals. Colombia’s longstanding civil conflict and
widespread displacement has also called into question many land titles and rights.
Particular to the case of Santurbán, in recent decades the mining multinationals have
entered the area and purchased lands from residents. A frequent complaint I heard was
that companies had entered and purchased many lands from miners and farmers. Because
of the way the transactions happened, many land owners felt like they had been tricked
into selling. Additionally, due to lack of economic opportunities elsewhere, many
previous land owners returned and became paid employees of multinationals. Questions
over rightful, equitable landownership could present significant obstacles to formalizing
PES. There is also concern that PES markets could overvalue lands in some areas, thus
driving migration. This would have to be carefully monitored given that with respect to
páramo lands, the overarching goal is to diminish and decrease population and
production.
Landell-Mills and Porras (2002) warn that by increasing the value of currently
marginal land, PES programs could increase the incentive for powerful groups to take
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control of it. Therefore PES might exacerbate problems in situations where tenure is
insecure.
4.3c Gold as resource curse: The nearby presence of easily accessible gold has already
caused tensions between towns in the Páramo. One manifestation is a phenomenon local
residents call “galafundeando,” in which people sneak into mining areas with hammers
and chisels with suitcases to extract gold. It is rumored that people can earn between
$1000 and $50,000 in a week (“La fiebre de oro…2014). Additionally, I heard rumors
about multinationals in the area turning a blind eye and allowing residents from certain
communities, and not others, to access their mine site for galafundeo. As long as
presence of and access to gold is nearby and easy, the value of PES payments to residents
will be comparatively devalued.
The other highly important factor when considering gold is that it attracts armed
actors. According to a personal account I heard from a Páramo resident and
documentation I reviewed of meeting minutes between the coordinating team of the Mesa
de Trabajo and area mayors, the illegal extraction of gold in the area is also associated
with armed groups. Public safety and security, then, must be taken into account both in
terms of social control by armed groups as well as the impact of the state’s armed
response to such presences on the civilian population. To the extent that armed groups
may control material resource wealth in the area, security threats these actors pose must
be accounted for in planning payments to residents within an eventual PES program.
4.3d Lack of cooperation: George et al. note that among the factors that have made PES
implementation feasible is a significant level of pre-existing organization and effective
coordination among farmers. As explained in previous sections, resource and access

	
  

68	
  

control by multinationals has caused suspicion and competition among neighboring
towns in páramo lands. Not only have multinationals in the area been responsible for
controlling who does and does not access have access to gold and jobs, they have also
provided community amenities to towns in which they operate thereby creating
relationships of patronage rather than partnership. This has further blurred boundaries
between state, market and civil society, which can produce a significant obstacle to
community cohesion and the institutional organization necessary to administer and
oversee equitable PES schemes. As noted, coordinating efforts have been easily
undermined by well-funded opponents.
4.3e Uncertain financial resources: The environmental NGO has identified one of the
main potential buyers of watershed services in the area to be the Bucaramanga Water
Authority (Acuaducto). However, both management and the water authority union have
been driving forces on the Comité and taken stances against raising taxes. In Colombia,
citizens pay taxes for PES services as part of their water bill. The Comité takes the stance
that the taxes citizens already pay is sufficient and with better management could and
should be redistributed. They are against any increase in these taxes to directly subsidize
Páramo residents.
4.3f Crops and livestock: The Mesa de Trabajo suggests working with farmers in the
area to strengthen low-impact farming and livestock production. I heard competing
versions from various environmentalists regarding the viability and possibility of
formalizing of crop production in the Páramo as a sustainable activity, especially since it
is not technically allowed. One páramo resident told me that twenty years ago, before the
arrival of the multinationals in the region, many of those who now solely dedicate
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themselves to mining activities - - either working for the large companies or through
artisanal mining- - also grew potatoes and onions. The resident told me that there was not
as much gold wealth in the area before the multinationals arrived and started the
exploration phase of operations, which made large gold veins more accessible. But that
taken aside, life in the area had been much “calmer” and free of armed actors. The
respondent also noted how difficult it would be for residents, now used to ‘easy’ wealth
and a relatively high standard of living, to revert back to primarily agricultural
production.
4.4 Advantages and Opportunities:
Despite many complicating factors, the Hoja de Rutas may present a series of advantages
and opportunities that together comprise a promising mechanism to improve institutional
capacity and living conditions for páramo residents. Likewise, PES could offer
immediate incentives for the protection of water resources, an urgent need in Santurbán.
As Dr. Cardenas noted, there seems to be consensus among stakeholders that on some
level, water must be protected. Likewise, he noted that the meetings and “Mesas de
Concertacion” led by the Ministry of Environment, if nothing more, are beginning to lay
the groundwork for sensitizing the participating population about the value of natural
resources. The next section will discuss advantages and opportunities of PES in the
Páramo and the larger context of the proposed alternative development roadmap.
4.4a Build institutional capacity: Though many competing and/or converging
economic interests may exist in the Páramo from gold extraction to green-capitalism,
raising the profile of the area in the eyes of the state does have the potential to improve
the efficiency in the allocation of natural, social and economic resources to Páramo
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residents. In spite of possible ulterior motives, the process is forcing an absentee state to
respond to the needs of an underserved population. According to the literature on PES
implementation (George et al. 2009) the effectiveness of the response may depend largely
upon the ability and degree to which community members determine and participate in
decision-making. In meeting minutes in which Mesa members met with mayors of Soto
Norte towns to discuss the roadmap, mayors indicated that they did not want a plan they
would have to “impose” on residents, but favored a “participatory process, discussed with
community members.” The notes do not offer more discussion concerning how in depth a
discussion process or consensus might be. I believe the statement to come less from
magnanimity than from pragmatism; the mayors know that new plans will only succeed
to the degree to which residents are willing. But such pragmatism, underscores how plans
will only be as successful if the rural residents opt for PES over previous productive
activities (especially gold extraction), and could increase the páramo residents’
legitimacy as political/social actors in the eyes of the state.
4.4b Facilitate consensus among the involved actors: Finding land-use methods that
are both beneficial to people and protect the environment is a challenge, but it also
represents an opportunity for decision-making that could result in more equitable
outcomes for all actors involved. It is forcing the previously absent state to respond to
Páramo residents’ needs. Not all residents bring the same histories to the table: some
farmers may benefit greatly from a PES program, but will those who have become used
to easy money from gold be satisfied with subsidies that just meet basic needs? A
conscious effort to balance voice and representative power must be developed. Dr.
Cardenas mentioned that the central theme around which consensus has been forged in

	
  

71	
  

the Environmental Ministry’s Mesas de Concertacion, is the central importance of water
to all parties involved. A consensus process offers the opportunity to introduce other key
ideas that go beyond an urban-biased (in this case) deep ecology approach that conceives
of pristine natural wilderness without humans. As such, páramo residents have a
pertinent and important historical link not just to their livelihoods, but also to the land
itself. Consequently, they have not only a right to viable livelihoods, but also an integral
role in the project of conservation.
In this case, the fact that there is a direct relationship between providers and users of
the service could work to the advantage of páramo residents. To the extent that plan
implementation and administration be transparent and participatory and not commandand-control, the process could leverage some degree of decision-making power for
páramo residents.
4.4c Generate new sources of funding for conservation: Given governmental
budgetary limitations, other funding sources that do not revolve around royalties from
large-scale mining operations will be necessary to help finance the alternative plan the
roadmap lays out. The Mesa de Trabajo has suggested multiple funding sources and
opportunities.
4.4d Transfer resources to socially and economically vulnerable sectors: A well
organized and administered PES plan in Soto Norte could help distribute wealth more
equally to residents who have not had the same access to gold as others have in the
region.
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Chapter 5: Conclusions and Recommendations
The delimitation debate in Santurbán Páramo raises questions about the government’s
responsibility to its people and its obligations to nature. In addition, it also raises
concerns about how and toward what purpose environmentalism becomes
institutionalized. Do governments have more responsibility to people who live in
resource-rich areas and to those who have been historically stigmatized as economically
backwards and outside the project of economic and social modernity? Do civil society
actors in urban areas have more rights than rural inhabitants or just a greater capacity to
organize and be heard? When the central government is unwilling or unable to fulfill a
minimal role, who should bear the burden of funding or subsidizing economic
opportunities that sufficiently preserve fragile natural environments?
Today these complications in governance are exacerbated by the presence of both
multinational capital and hegemonic discourses that legitimate neoliberalism and foreign
investment. The United Nations and international lending agencies depict large-scale
mining as a form of economic and environmentally sustainable development (Fierro
2012) while small scale miners get cast as illegal leftist insurgents who pollute the
environment.
Recommendations for change at the local level come from my final research
question: “How could the ambiguous role of the state both close and open opportunities
for better outcomes for Santurbán Páramo residents?” The answer to this call for
meaningful collaborative management seems to hinge on the creation of governance
systems where state, civil society, nature and private capital can respond meaningfully to
the need to change status quo territorial and economic management. As I have shown, the
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complexities of the actors involved and how their interests converge and diverge in the
Santurbán debate is forcing the state at different levels and in various offices to better
coordinate its own bureaucracy in ways it otherwise might not. The involvement of
outside entities (PNUD, NGOs) within the Mesa could be seen as forms of globalized
“metasteering” (Jessop 2002, 115) at the service of global regimes of accumulation.
Similarly, the Comité’s rigidly reformist approach may circumscribe the definition of
justice to mean only environmental protection and not environmental justice adequately
accounts for the people most closely impacted. The Comité in its current form as a
counter-hegemony must grapple with its role in and the consequence of stigmatizing rural
residents. It may consider ways in which affirming participatory governance systems that
strengthen local knowledges and relationships with the land could counter sub-hegemonic
power nodes at work in the Paramo. Given the multifaceted actors and agendas of each of
these blocks, is there a system that also serves to embed mechanisms of oversight and
accountability toward and within the state instead of resulting in more political stalemate?
What options are available to further enfranchise páramo residents as vital actors with a
role in protecting important natural resources? Recommendations for local change are
divided into two sets that address how páramo residents may be empowered and overall
equity may be improved while protecting as much of the vital páramo region as possible.
The first set considers short-term, more easily implementable actions, and the second set
presents long-term, more difficult actions that may require dramatic societal or
conceptual change.
These recommendations are based on the overarching recommendation that the
National Ministry of Environment promptly sets, and completes the required
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administrative act of official delimitation in a way that maximizes protected zones in
páramo in compliance with Humboldt Institute’s recommendations. As multiple activists
and scholars have shown, not only is mining, particularly gold mining, not beneficial to
the Colombian people, but is also a continuation of colonial extractive economies of
dependency (i.e. extractive industry with little added value) that exacerbates situations of
internal conflict, displacement, human rights violations, environmental degradation, and
poverty, among others. The lack of clarity and a definitive protective line is causing
community mistrust and fatigue in both rural and urban areas. As climate change
worsens, the Colombian state will increasingly have to address conflict and the roots of
poverty in ways that protect “strategic” lands and the populations that depend on them.
This will not come by ceding lands to capital interests. Whether X Oro will have
presence in the area or not, and in what capacity, must be decided and enforced with
clarity by the Colombian state. Lingering multinational presence in the area is
antipathetic to a participatory process of ecological service. Multinationals will likely use
their clout to continue to pit communities against each other, institutional authority, and
downstream residents.
Given the low rate of royalties and the paltry value-added income brought to regional
and national economies, the state must wrestle with how to leave the gold in the ground.
Short of relocating all Páramo residents and blocking access to the area with military
units, the problem of a massive gold vein inside a delicate wetland in the context of
armed conflict persists. As if this were not complex enough, it must also be considered to
what extent the government may be putting this population in danger by treating them as
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a kind of buffer zone between outside, potentially violent interests and the enormous,
exposed gold vein.
5.1 Mesa de Trabajo members begin building relationships of trust with páramo
communities Before bringing constituents together, it is important to establish as accurate
a view as possible of the base conditions extant in the communities, and to start creating
spaces of interaction and trust. This step will be crucial in foreseeing potential conflict
areas between groups and creating a strategy to allow everyone’s voices to be heard.
Each group, then, must be allowed to present its own realities and perspectives during the
negotiating process. It is important to remain cognizant of power dynamics that tend to
give primacy to capital investment to the detriment of traditionally secluded groups.
5.1a Identify outside facilitators to build trust. As I encountered in my research
trip to the Páramo and in discussions with other researchers, logistical and security
dynamics are complex. Facilitators must be ready to encounter community fatigue,
reticence, and suspicion and take into account the contentious relationships between
urban and rural residents, the fraught history of rural residents with the CDMB, and
the protracted delimitation debate that has resulted in empty promises from
politicians. Any outsiders must consider that certain risks lie in approaching the
delimitation debate and alternative development solutions solely from a regulatory
standpoint. By doing so, the planning process risks falling into at least two historical
pitfalls – a command and control approach which results in “paper parks,” or
cooptation (and possible corruption). If, however, approached with the goal of
community-building among páramo residents, it is more likely that community-led
solutions that are truly sustainable can be developed and implemented.
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5.1b Accurate inquiry and analysis of páramo residents’ development visions:
Given proper alternative options and transitional support, perhaps some residents
would choose to relocate out of the páramo. It is hard to approach this issue without
having a clear sense of how residents would respond given stricter control on smallscale mining, galafundeando, etc. Would residents be willing to commit themselves
to alternative productive activities as proposed by the Mesa de Trabajo and others?
How can they be assured proper training and support for implementing alternative
livelihoods and lifestyles? How long can a PES scheme be sustained and what options
should be put in place to help residents transition to other areas if necessary?
5.1c Power mapping municipal institutions in Soto Norte: In beginning dialogues
with residents, it is important to make every possible attempt to understand how
institutions, authorities, other powerful groups, and citizens interact with each other.
How and to what effect those interactions influence the community should inform the
process of “institutionalization” that the Mesa proposes—to the extent the Mesa is
truly willing to create a participatory, rather than a top-down, process. This step will
be crucial in forestalling potential conflict areas between groups and creating a
strategy to allow everyone’s voices to be heard. Each group, then, must be allowed to
present its own realities and perspectives during the negotiating process. It is
important to remain cognizant of power dynamics that tend to give primacy to capital
investment to the detriment of traditionally secluded groups. Institutional mapping
may provide insights into processes of social capital formation or erosion (Goodhand
2001). Power mapping in these regions would have to consider how guerilla,
paramilitary or other armed groups could threaten residents’ security, put pressure on
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them to act in certain ways, or inhibit the ease with which residents can openly
collaborate with institutions. To honor residents’ safety, it is advisable to try to collect
as much of this information in one-on-one, semi-formal interviews as opposed to
mapping or questionnaires. The town mayors, who are already participating in the
Mesa, can be very valuable in providing the first phase of such information. However,
as Goodhand notes, information is part of the war economy and people may choose to
hide some forms of information and promote others (2001). Although this applies to
all research contexts, the problem is more acute in areas of conflict. Particular
attention should be paid to triangulation and cross checking with a variety of sources
with mindfulness of the dangers of bias.
5.2 Mesa de Trabajo: Analysis of economic factors
5.2a Address the proximity of gold vein. A perception of Páramo residents that shifts
from seeing them as destroyers to protectors of the environment via a PES scheme, could
facilitate the groups’ social enfranchisement. Yet a fundamental problem persists—the
close access to gold. What monetary sum will offset the financial disparities between
those who have easy access to gold and those who do not? Are there other ways to
equitably compensate residents in addition to or besides payments that could offset the
opportunity cost of income from mining (in any form)? Will setting up such systems
require a big initial investment, then taper off as activities fall into place? Will all
residents be compensated the same regardless of whether they are miners or farmers?
Should they be permitted to continue mining activities? These and other questions should
be considered in order to realistically assess how much and from where PES funds will
be obtained.
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5.2b Devise an equitable plan for PES disbursement. It is very unlikely that the
BanCo2 model, which consigns PES to the philanthropic whims of urban citizens, will be
the stable and sustainable financial source needed to effectively subsidize the Mesa de
Trabajo’s plan in the Páramo. Yet given the negative perception of páramo residents as
aligned with large-scale mining, Bucaramanga residents will likely continue to reject the
imposition of more taxes, which is the current position of the Comité. As other studies of
water service schemes in Latin America have suggested, downstream residents’
perceptions that PES is unfair, even when offering an empirical win-win solution, can
cause urban residents to reject the idea. They may in fact prefer to be taxed for
infrastructure improvements or other technocratic solutions (Van Hecken et al. 2012).
Urban residents have been inundated by messages against mining in the Páramo, which
cast rural residents in a disparaging light.
5.2c In depth study by Humboldt institute to evaluate the environmental
sustainability of the Mesa de Trabajo’s recommendations with a working
consideration of alternatives:
The Mesa de Trabajo’s plan does not comply with the strict letter of the law because it
suggests finding ways to make both mining and farming more sustainable, while the law
prohibits either activity in protected areas. There does not seem to be much clarity in this
regard. Institutions such as the Von Humboldt can play an important role in assessing
how much and what kind of productive activities the Páramo can sustain, and advocate
for clear guidelines and enforcement. There is little doubt that large-scale mining will be
destructive in and to Páramo and ecotone regions. But what if the Mesa de Trabajo’s
multifaceted plan to seek alternative livelihoods is, in the end, missing the proverbial
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forest for the trees? If biologically unsound, the Mesa’s plan risks not only the
destruction of the very ecosystem it is attempting to protect, but repercussions for Páramo
residents in continually changing the terms of their residency and relation to the land.
5.2d Back-up plan to include relocation of residents
Short of relocating all Páramo residents and blocking access to the area with military
units, the problem of a massive gold vein inside a delicate wetland in the context of
armed conflict persists. With this complexity, it is important to evaluate to what extent
alternative plans for productive activities that maintain people in the region may be
putting the population in danger. In other words, it must be assessed to what extent
maintaining residents in the area through various project makes them a kind of buffer
zone between outside, potentially violent actors and the enormous, exposed gold vein.
Rights advocates have noted the sub-optimal results in relocating communities
that face large-scale extractive projects on their lands. “Asking a community to choose
where it wants to be relocated,” said a Colombian lawyer working on collective rights vs.
coal mining “is like asking a duck which sauce it prefers to be cooked in.”
How deep is the injury that lies in severing communities’ historic and traditional
ties to land for the sake of natural resource exploitation? Can those injuries be mitigated
if relocation happens with the ultimate goal of ecosystem protection? As the effects of
climate change become more severe, these and related questions will have to be
addressed. This is why it is crucial that historically marginalized community members’
voices and visions are represented proportionately alongside more powerful social actors.
Perhaps, there was a grain of truth of truth beyond what appeared to be
manipulation by the gold company, when the farmer told me that if offered reasonable
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compensation, relocating out of the Páramo into a different, more fertile area would be
ideal. Several social organizations mentioned that one alternative would be for the
government to buy (or expropriate) the large tracts of unused land that lie outside the
páramo from the landowners. It is hard to evaluate the feasibility of such an idea without
knowing concretely who owns the land and how the state could find money to purchase
it. This is a worthwhile point of investigation both for social organizations and the Mesa
de Trabajo.
The question of community composition and cohesion of the various páramo
towns will be a necessary point of investigation. I heard repeated accounts of the
problems that resulted when the multinationals first entered the area and offered money
for the purchase of residents’ land titles. Many residents took the payments, which
seemed high at the time, only to return them after finding the sum insufficient to set up a
sustainable life in the city or elsewhere. How then, may the state offer transitional support
for residents that might opt to relocate? Might residents be more likely to thrive if
relocated as communities rather than as individuals? Are there relocation methods that
would preserve preexisting communal bonds and social capital?
5.3 Transforming modes of governance
5.3a Comité undertake internal evaluation of its actions regarding Páramo
residents. As noted previously, the Comité is not a monolithic block. In many ways, it
should be commended for its unity despite internal ideological and political differences.
And indeed such cohesion toward single-pointed action has been necessary given the
force with which mining projects are imposed on communities. However, given the
Comité’s own consolidation of power in the face of this dynamic, it is advisable to
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reassess the overarching consequences of its own actions. As noted, because of the
composition of key members of leadership, its overarching politics align with private
urban capital interests. Other vocal members, however, such as human rights
organizations, lawyer’s collectives, student groups, etc., could take a role in helping steer
the Comité’s discourse from one of environmentalism to one of environmental justice: a
discourse that recognizes the interconnection between urban and rural residents’
outcomes not just for Bucaramanga, but for the entire province of Soto Norte.
Activists and advocates in Colombia are starting to approach the problematic
intersection of environmental rights and labor sovereignty. For example, the national
movement RECLAME is attempting to bring together small-scale miners and
environmental activist in order to affect the expansion of the mining and energy
industries. The juxtaposition of urban-based environmental activists along with smallscale miners from rural areas has brought the two seemingly disparate constituencies into
a dialogue. With the shared goal of changing national mining policy, for example,
environmental groups were forced to contend with the small-scale miner’s right to work –
especially given the lack of readily viable alternatives. On the other side, small-scale
miners are acknowledging the harmful environmental effects of their own productive
activities that involve mercury and cyanide along with degradation of shrinking Páramo
lands.
National environmental organizations like CENSAT are working to recognize and
institutionalize community-based water governance and raise awareness among urban
residents about their very dependence on the services of rural water communities.
Historically, organized rural communities that have provisioned water services have done
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so without state support and against the grain of dominant development policies. Even so,
these communities and their water networks have guaranteed water for rural and urban
populations. It is estimated that around 120000 small service providers, many in rural
zones, exist in Colombia (Urrea 2013). If urban residents could see the value in helping
offer Páramo residents find viable alternatives to mining, perhaps they would be more
willing to pay.
After a 2010 water referendum process in which civil society pressured the
government to take an explicit stance against the privatization of water, these community
providers began to formally organize. The National Congress did not did pass legislation
against water privitization, the referendum process generated important outcomes like the
National Network of Community Aqueducts. In this community-managed model, water
prices are set in community assemblies, not according to supply and demand, but under a
guiding principle of solidarity and reciprocity (Urrea 2013). This model, which contrasts
with private investment or transnational control, is a form of local management of
territory that has worked in Colombia for 50 years. It operates under the reasoning that
degraded lands don’t produce enough quality water for humans. As such, the defense and
care of land is a necessary condition for water management and is not just a guarantee of
water for rural populations. It also safeguards the water sources for urban centers.
5.3b Alternative working group: Some members of the Comité who aren’t part of the
core leadership have proposed an alternative space similar to the Mesa de Trabajo in
which NGOs could consult with both state officials and paramo residents. Such a body or
group of individuals could play an important regulatory and oversight role in the PES
administrative process while still protecting the interests and rights of páramo residents.
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So far, the Comité has been very effective in demarcating rights of urban dwellers
to clean water. As such, it could parlay its momentum and authority toward promoting a
shifting consciousness that recognizes the historic role of rural communities in
provisioning water for urban areas. On the one hand, the implementation of PES scheme
for Páramo residents would happen via the commodification of nature—a process that
some environmental and social activists oppose for multiple reasons. But the social
valorization process through which Páramo residents come to be regarded as purveyors of
necessary services could offer them a lucrative livelihood. The process could also elicit a
shift in perception that has cast rural residents as nature destroyers toward a perception of
them as guardians.
5.4 Strategic alliances of support for páramo residents from organizations and land
reform movements in Bucaramanga and Santander
The previous questions highlight the relative social isolation of páramo residents. More
than a century of international extractive mining presence in the region (Carreño 2011)
has caused uneven development in Santurbán and social divisions in the páramo region.
This, along with the remote and harsh terrain, has, to some degree, isolated Páramo
residents from greater Santander society and social movements.
One of the most active and influential agrarian rights/reform organizations in
Colombia works in Santander. The Asociación Campesina del Valle del Río	
  Cimitarra
(ACVC) is a regional organization comprised of farmers that works through community
councils (juntas de acción communal), cooperatives, and other rural workers’ groups
toward the comprehensive defense of human rights and equitable land reform. The
ACVC works principally in 8 regions in the Magdalena River Valley. As part of its
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outreach, the organization has done important work in neighboring regions with artisanal
mining cooperatives. Part of its work in this context has been to travel to remote,
highland gold mining regions—for example, Sur de Bolivar—to help educate small-scale
miners on land titling issues and dangers of encroaching multinationals. Yet, a vital part
of such educational work, is educating and supporting small-scale miners to return to
agrarian forms of labor.
Even if regional government is able to set up and administer a PES scheme for
páramo residents, how far will new economic opportunities go in addressing years of
stigmatization, economic instability and/or dependency on transnational capital? It is
unlikely that the free market or state-administered programs will help cultivate true
empowerment and resiliency for páramo residents. Incorporation into a broader
movement toward equitable land distribution, however, could achieve this goal.
Grassroots organizations like the ACVC are joining larger coalitions of campesinos,
indigenous, and Afro-Colombians that are trying to forge spaces (through Campesino
Reserve Zones and other legal frameworks) where campesinos can undertake
autonomous and sustainable life projects and productive activities.
These movements most recently built critical mass and formed the National
Agrarian Summit, which unified the needs of peasant, indigenous and Afro-Colombian
organizations in one set of petitions. Together, they represent the economic, social,
environmental, cultural and territorial political demands of these underrepresented
groups. (Pliego de exigencias de la Cumbre Agraria 2014)
The first point in the list of their demands to the Colombian state is the
implementation of a land management and distribution system (Ordenamiento
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Territorial) that gives communities the power and opportunity to redefine sustainable
land use and more control over their land and mineral rights. The third point (following
point #2, “Local economies against the model of dispossession”) calls for a reformulation
of the mining and energy sectors in light of their harmful effects on rural peoples and
lands.
Underpinning these petitions is a call to be protected against the violence that so
often accompanies activism by subaltern groups. In Colombia, indigenous, AfroColombian, and campesinos organized for the defense of land become targets of violence
by the state, para-state, and guerilla groups. The ACVC is a leading organization in
Santander that is part of a broadening grass-roots agrarian movement in Colombia that
works toward a negotiated end to the civil war based on collective rights and communityled, equitable land reform. Grassroots organizations like the ACVC could support páramo
residents to define and reclaim the vitality of their rural identities in relation to the land
once (if) multinationals leave. Such connection to the larger grassroots environmental
justice movement could be an important way for páramo residents to be supported in
authoring their own sustainable productive and life activities and resist the possibility of
empty changes from one form of dependency and exploitation (transnational capital) to
another (PES subsidies/ green capitalism). A shift in consciousness could allow páramo
residents to honestly evaluate their own impacts on páramo land in the pursuit of gold in
any form. It could help break down suspicions and barriers in the region and forge new
kinds of supportive networks.
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